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PREFACE 
This work is based largely on my own reading of the relevant primary sources. It does not lay claim to previously unexplored territory , but it has brought materials together in an original way provided a new perspective on the formulation of Canadian policy during the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty . The ideas that are not my own have been cited in the fo otnotes . The largest part of my primary research was conducted at the Public Archives of Canada and in the Department of External Affairs, both of which are in Ottawa. Some supplementary research was conducted at the Public rec ord Office in Kew . These sources as well as the secondary sources are listed in the bibliography. 
I would like t o thank the Board of Trustees of the Mackenzie King scholarship for funding my stay at Cambridge, Dr David Reynolds for his patient supervision, and Dr Brian Villa of Ottawa University for his great encouragement. I would also like to express my appreciation to Belinda Dodson and John Henshaw for their invaluable assistance. 
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Peter Henshaw 
St John's College, 
August 1985. 
- Intr~ducti0n 
Canada agreed in March 1948 t0 join the United Kingdom and United States in discussi0ns that led, eventually, to the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty. Canada's action was, in 
s0me ways, unprecedented. Despite fighting in the First and Sec0nd W0rld Wars at the side of Britain, Canada had never made a 
f0rmal commitment t0 Imperial defence. Outside of those wars, Canada had never even made a real contribution to her own defence. Why, then, did Canada assume a pr0minent role in the 
creati~n of the Treaty? The answer may be found in an analysis of 
the formulation of Canadian policy and the considerations upon 
which it was based: domestic politics, economics, defence, and internationalist ideals. 
In Canada, where the federal government was preoccupied with 
reconciling the diverse interests of two language groups, domestic politics were, not surprisingly, a primary consideration in the f0rmulati0n 0f external p0licy. William Ly0n Mackenzie 
King, Prime Minister from 1921 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1948, was 
unwilling to pursue any policy that threatened the unity of French- and English-speaking Canadians which was inseparable from 
the solidarity of his own Liberal party . The decision to enter 
security discussions with ~~ the United States and the United 
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Kingdom was an indication that domestic opinion had become more 
sympathetic to a Canadian commitment to the defence of Europe 
against Communism. 
Just how sympathetic was not yet clear. King was certain that 
if war broke out in Europe, popular feeling would lead the 
country to fight once again at the side of Britain and the 
western Allies. In the event that an overseas defence commitment 
was politically acceptable, a north Atlantic pact held certain 
attractions. The pitfalls of a purely Commonwealth grouping or a 
bilateral arrangement with the United States could be avoided. A 
pact would help to resolve some of the domestic controversy 
associated with making the adjustments that were necessary in 
Canada's defence and economic relations with the United States 
and the United Kingdom. More importantly, an Atlantic pact that 
preserved peace would allow Canada to avoid the divisive issue of 
participation in an overseas conflict as well as the strain on 
manpower and resources that accompanied being pushed into war 
ahead of the United states. Despite these attractions, the 
problem of overcoming isolationist sentiment remained. King's 
support for the North Atlantic Treaty was contingent upon the 
absence of any substantial domestic opposition to participation. 
While he was Prime Minister, Canada's devotion to the Treaty was, 
therefore, somewhat tentative. 
After the Second World War, as before, Canada's own defence 
tended to be ignored because of the position of the United States 
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as an irresis tible yet largely benev0lent f0rce in N0rth America. 
Eur0pean security had become significant t0 Canada through her 
experience in in tw0 w0rld wars and in 1948 the spread Gf 
Communism was perceived as an alarming t . t . 6\-N . G I repe 1 10n~ az1 ermany s 
expansi0n under appeasement. In the 1930s, King maintained, in 
the interest 0f national unity, a p0licy of "no commitments" to 
Imperial defence. In the 1940s, h0wever, a y0unger generation of 
policy makers had risen to prominence in Ottawa. They were 
c0nvinced that effective action was necessary to prevent a major 
war. For them, Canada's participation in the North Atlantic 
Treaty was essential as a matter of principle. The m0st 
significant feature of the Treaty for King was the acceptance by 
the United States of its obligation to defend western Europe. 
Canada also faced serious problems of adjustment in her trade 
relations with Britain and the United States. P0licy was torn 
between pursuing freer trade with the United States and 
maintaining the pre-war pattern of a high volume of exp0rts to 
Britain. The younger economists in the Department of Finance were 
prop0nents of multilateral trading and advocated the breakdGwn of 
protected systems. This attitude was supp0rted by the members of 
the Department of External Affairs which had always concerned 
itself with trade relations. A sharp m0ve away from trade with 
Britain in favour 0f cl0ser ties with the United States was 
untenable pGlitically, but ecGnomic realities continued to push 
Canada in that direction . 
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The divergent aims of Canadian policy in the p0st-war peri0d 
corresponded to the political and physical problems of adjusting 
to a new distribution of power. The civil service was contr0lled 
by a younger generation of men, wedded to internati0nalist ideals 
which shaped their attitudes to both trade and security. AmGng 
these men there was general agreement that restrictive 
nati0nalism was inc0mpatible with well ordered state relati0ns 
This was the basis of the great interest displayed by Canadians 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and in the United 
Nations Organisation. L0uis St Laurent, the Minister for External 
Affairs, supported his Department in their aim t0 create an 
effective system of collective security first through the United 
Nations and then through the North Atlantic Treaty. Effectively, 
this was a direct challenge t0 King's "no commitments" p0licy. 
While he remained in office, internationalist aims, both in trade 
and defence matters were kept in check. After St Laurent was 
chosen as the new Liberal leader in August 1948, however, 
external policy entered a new phase and Canada became much more 
firmly dev0ted to the creati0n of the N0rth Atlantic Treaty. 
The aim of this dissertation is to assess relative significance 
of c0nsiderations of domestic p0litics, defence, economics, and 
internationalist ideals, during four phases leading t0 the 
signing of the N0rth Atlantic Treaty: summer 1947 t0 11 March 
1948 when a decision was taken t0 j0in in the first round of 
negotiations; 11 March t0 the end 0f June 1948, when the 
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Cabinet's reactien to the Berlin crisis revealed that continued 
existence of old fears about military entanglements ; the 
beginning of July to 15 November 1948 when Louis St . Laurent 
replaced Mackenzie King as Prime Minister; and mid-November to 
the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 . 
- 6 -
Chapter 1 
Historical Background to Canada's Entry into the North Atlantic 
Treaty 
Canada's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty was a significant 
departure from a long standing tradition of avoiding external 
defence c0mmitments in the interests of domestic politics. In 
the First and Second World Wars as well as the B0er War, Canada 
fought at the side of Britain. This had not been on the basis of 
any formal commitment to Imperial defence. Canada's contribution 
to those wars was related to the sentiment and historical 
connections that accompanied membership in the British Empire . 
Those wars were accompanied by bitter controversy within Canada 
which arose l argely from the divergent interests of French-and 
English-speaking Canadians. The threat of such controversy had 
fostered a general reluctance on the part of successive 
governments in Ottawa t0 define and make explicit Canada's 
relationship with _ Britain in matters of defence. After the 
Second W0rld War, Canada was faced with some difficult problems 
of adjustment in her relations with Britain and the United States 
- an Atlantic pact came to be viewed as a means of resolving some 
of the same problems . 
A preoccupation with domestic politics wa~ natural in a country 
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divided along lines of language and religion. Maintaining the 
unity of the country (and his own Liberal party) was certainly of paramount importance to Mackenzie King, who as Prime Minister, had effective control over policy for most of the years between 1921 and 1948. Between the wars, the isolationist sentiments of French and a not insignificant number of English-speaking Canadians translated into an avoidance of peacetime military 
commitments to the Empire. King's decision to allow Canada to 
enter into the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty was in 
some ways a reversal of his policy of "no commitments", but while he remained in office, Canadian support for a regional security 
arrangement was anything but certain. No firm action would be taken by King in the absence of a political consensus. 
King was willing to join in the creation of a treaty in part because, through the experience of two world wars, many Canadians believed that their own security was linked to the security of Europe. Canada had never been persuaded to offer support as part 
of a Commonwealth grouping, but in 1948, unlike the 1930s, a Canadian together with a much more significant American 
commitment to Eur0p~an security was sought by Britain. British 
and Canadian objectives had converged to a certain extent. A 
commitment by the United States to the defence of western Europe became an important foreign policy aim for Canada, as well as for Britain, because Canadians had a sense that their own interest 
were inextricably linked to this area of the world. Although 
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Mackenzie King refused to allow Canada to take too prominent a role in the creation of a treaty , effo~ts were made to draw the Americans into a firm commitment that a multilateral treaty entailed. There were other policy makers in Ottawa who sought broader aims such as creating an effective replacement for the United Nations. This could not be achieved unless Canada played a more active role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty - a course of action fer which domestic support was less certain. The Prime Minister saw the Treaty primarily in terms of its potential for alleviating some of Canada's existing external relations problems. An alliance of the north Atlantic nations, unlike a Presidental guarantee or a new lend-lease agreement, could resolve some of the problems of adjustment faced by Canada in her trade and defence relations with the British and Americans. 
This chapter describes the relationship between Canada's external policy and her changing interests and aspirations with emphasis upon the influence of domestic politics. To provide a broader context for the analysis of Canadian policy during the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty , certain themes will be sketched out: the character of Canada's population, her defence and trade relations, her attitude towards international institutions, and above all her domestic politics . It should then be possible to show that the North Atlantic Treaty represented a significant break from an external policy 
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tradition, which in the interests of domestic politics, tended to 
be characterized by caution and inaction. 
During 1948 and 1949 the greatest uncertainty facing policy 
makers in Ottawa was whether domestic support could be found for 
participation in something which proponents were anxious to 
describe as far rem0ved from "military alliances of the 0ld sort" 
but which remained a military alliance all the same. While there 
were still, in the post-war years, a large number of English 
speaking Canadians who supported the maintenance of close ties 
with Britain, more independent nationalist sentiments and 
isolationism (something predominant in but not exclusive to 
Quebec) made acceptance of peacetime military commitments with 
any country, problematical at best. 
Historically, there had been, in French Canada, a negative 
attitude t oward overseas military commitments. This had not 
prevented French Canadians from participating in the expedition 
to rescue General Gordon or volunteers from fighting for the 
Papacy in the wars of Italian unification; but when they were 
asked to join in making a large contribution to a cause they did 
not consider their own, the "nationalist" sentiments which grew 
through the twentieth century came to the fore and political 
controversy ensued. Even in English Canada there had never been 
a strong military tradition, as was reflected in the country's 
tiny peacetime defence forces . Demands from English-speaking 
Canadians that a contribution be made t o the defence e f the 
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Empire, had in the past only become powerful enough to produce 
positive results when the need for such support had become 
obvious. Thus little contribution was made to Imperial defence 
outside of the Boer war and the First and Second World Wars. In 
1948 it was not clear that the European situation appeared grave 
enough to overcome isolationist sentiments. 
The roots of French Canadian hostility te overseas military 
commitments should be examined. With the German attack on France 
in 1914 there was an expectation that French Canadians would 
rally t o the support of their mother country just as their 
English speaking counterparts rallied t o the support of Britain . 
The relationship of the French in Canada to those in Europe was 
much more complex. The France that they were expected to assist 
was the France that had abandoned them after the conquest in 1763 
and which had been effectively cut off since then . The Catholic 
Church was very much the dominant force in what remained a very 
traditional society until after the Second World War- it was not 
until well after the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance that 
control of public welfare and eduction shifted away from the 
Church. There was more affinity between Quebec and the Ancien 
Regime than the godless France of the Revolution. Antagonism 
between the two language groups over participation in the Great 
War was increased with the virtual destruction of the tradition 
of military service that had existed among French Canadians, 
through a rather perverse mismanagement of recruiting at 
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the hands ef the Scettish and Orange Presbyterians who contrelled 
the militia in the years leading into the War. [1] 
During the Great War, the desire to raise and maintain, despite 
heavy losses, a large Canadian force led to the adoption of 
conscriptien in 1917 - an act which completely alienated many 
French and a substantial number of English speaking Canadians . 
Sentiment favouring participation in the war centred in urban 
areas where "Imperialism" had also been strongest. French Canada 
remained predominantly rural until after the Secend World War and 
its attitudes toward conscription did not contrast so sharply 
with rural areas in the rest of the country - particularly among 
those English speaking Canadians who had been in North America 
for several generations. Almost exactly half of the Canadian 
volunteers in the Great War were men who were born in Britain.[2] 
There was substantial hostility toward censcription in western 
Canada which had accepted a large number of immigrants from 
eastern Europe and the American west. 
The pacifist and isolationist sentiments of English speaking 
Canadians, were represented, particularly in the prairie 
provinces, by the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF); an 
organization that was a curious combination of secialism, 
agrarian populism , and to a lesser extent trade unionism. Escott 
1. John Keegan, Six armies in Normandy,p.119 . 
2 . Stacey , Canada and the age of conflict,1 , photo caption. 
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Reid, who became the acting Under-Secretary for External Affairs 
in the autumn of 1948, was an active member of the intellectual 
wing of the CCF. He, along with alm0st all of the senior members 
of the Department 0f External Affairs in the 1930s, believed that 
the Europeans should be left t0 settle their own disputes.[3] In 
Parliament the CCF were led by J.S. Woodsworth, who openly 
opposed the declaration of war in 1939· In 1948 it was expected 
that the CCF would lead the opposition to participation in a 
military alliance. 
Those Canadians who favoured the maintenance of British ties 
and who were wary of the danger of American dominance had 
traditionally been represented by the Conservatives. Such 
sentiments were not exclusive t o that party, however, and there 
were numerous English speaking Liberals who favoured keeping 
Canada firmly within the Empire , although they tended t o place 
emphasis upon aut0nomy within that grouping . Mackenzie King was 
the most important of these. 
Crucial to Mackenzie King's and the Liberal Party's political 
power was the one third of Canada's population that was 
French-speaking. To hold office the Liberals also needed 
substantial support outside of Quebec. King's policies were not 
by any means based simply upon maintaining the support of French 
Canada- the Canadian declaration of war in 1939 is evidence 
3. Reid,On duty,p.9~1o . 
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enough of that. On the other hand, opposition in Quebec could only be overcome by near unanimous support in the rest of the country. As early as 1919, King had noted that "Quebec dominates the situation in the House of Commons".[4] He was also one of the few English speaking Liberals to side with Laurier against conscription and to not join the Union government. That stance led to his defeat in the 1917 general election but it led to his gaining support from Quebec delegates and to his selection as leader of the Liberal party in 1921. 
In the late 1930s, Mackenzie King believed that the country would not wish to remain neutral in a war involving Germany and Britain. He sought to maintainea the unity of the two language groups thr~Jmgh a policy of "no cemmi tments" to any Imperial defence- a policy that was criticized as being anti-British but which from King's perspective was the only course which would not lead to a further l oosening of Imperial ties. Isolationism was strong in Canada during the inter-war years and was only overcome by the swing of public feeling against Hitler's Germany which took place throughout the English-speaking world. Unlike the United States, that swing of opinion was supplemented in Canada by sentiment and Imperial ties which together induced her to declare, independently of the Empire, war on Germany. 
King believed that the political costs outweighed the benefits 
4 . Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict,1 ,p. 285 . 
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of securing a stronger voice in world affairs either through a 
unified Empire, joint direction of the war, the League or the 
United Nations. When, before and during1he Great War, Sir Robert 
Borden led the Conservatives in fighting for greater influence in 
Imperial policy, Canada was more closely linked, although more by 
sentiment and tradition than by constitutional arrangements, to 
Great Britain. Canadian security was still guaranteed by British 
power and in the event of a major crisis there would almost 
inevitably be demands from within the Dominion to fight at the 
side of Britain. In those circumstances there were distinct 
advantages in having a voice in British foreign policy. These 
advantages could only be gained at a cost: shared direction of 
Imperial policy entailed an appropriate material contribution to 
defence and association with Imperial policy carried with it a 
certain amount of domestic controversy. The contribution of the 
First Canadian Corps in the Great War was used by Borden to 
secure a voice in the direction of the war and an independent 
position at the Versailles Conference. The country, however, had 
almost been split over the conscription issue and no Canadian 
government had .ever made a significant contribution to Imperial 
defence during time of peace . Even expenditure for home defence 
was virtually non-existent. The belief that the American 
invasion of British North America had been thwarted by hastily 
mobilized militia forces contributed to the myth that Canadian 
defence needs could be met through last minute measures taken 
when emergencies arose. That Canadian defence had in reality 
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depended upon the British Regular Army and the Royal Navy was blissfully ignored since t o recognize this was to admit that Canada was not pulling her own weight in the defence of the Empire . 
During King's years as Prime Minister (1921 to 1930 and 1935 to 1948) , the ties that bound Canada to Britain were loosening- the 
more independent status that had been achieved during the war was f ormalized through the Statute of Westminster of 1931 which gave the Dominions legisl ative aut onomy . Unlike Australia, New Zealand, or to a lesser extent South Africa, Canada had rapidly become less dependent on Britain for defence and could safely disregard calls for contributions to Imperial defence, particularly since to disregard defence was to avoid heavy expenditures and political contention. The inter-war years can be seen as the period when Canadian security became less dependent on Britain than on the United States. Previously, the I Americans m y not have accepted an attack by an outside power on the North American territories that were part of the British Empire, but as various boundary disputes evidenced, the intentions of the Americans themselves were by no means peaceful. By the end of the First World War American territorial ambiti ons on their own continent had receded and in 1938, F. D. Roosevelt gave a speech i n Canada proclaiming that 
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"the peaple af the United 
deminati on ef Canadian 
States 
S0il 
w0uld n0t stand 
is threatened 
idly by if 
by another 
empire" . [5] . Although many Canadians may have been l0ath to 
admit it, their country was drifting int0 the American arbit and 
the ability to influence British policy had became a less 
valuable commodity. The ass0ciated domestic c0sts even led King 
t a shy away from demanding a share in the directian af the Sec0nd World War , despite Canada's large material cantribution which 
would have made th0se demands hard t 0 resist in the years befere 
the Americans entered the war . 
Canadian defence p0licy entered a substantially different phase 
after the Sec0nd Warld War largely because she could n0t return 
te the 0ld attitude of benign neglect in security matters . American demands for c0ntribution te comman defence were not so 
easily ignored as the requests frem Britain had been . The basis f or c0-0peration with the United States was laid in 1940 through 
the Ogdensburg agreement which set up the Permanent J oint Board 
en Defence (PJBD) . [6] Difficulties associated with this new 
relationship were rec0gnized bef0re the end 0f the war. The Canadian conclusi0~ after a meeting of the PJBD was that the 
5. Stacey , Canada and the age of cenflict , 2 , p . 226 . 
6 . H0lmes , The shaping of peace , 1 , p~ 23 . 
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United States might be "expected to take an active interest in Canadian defence preparations and may indeed exert pressure."[?] Canadians had little desire to accept both the responsibility and 
the expense of defending America's northern approaches, but this 
could not be left to the Americans alone without raising concern 
over Canadian sovereignty and Commonwealth ties. 
From 1945 onwards, King had greater difficulty pursuing policies which minimised involvement in world affairs. There was 
a new and younger group of policy makers in Ottawa who sought to 
secure a much more prominent international role for Canada. In 
support of their aims, the Department of External Affairs pointed 
to a shift in public opinion in favour of Canada's active participation in such institutions as the United Nations.[8] This 
was an argument that was difficult for the Prime Minister to 
resist. As in much of the English-speaking world, the casualties 
and destruction of two world wars contributed to the generation 
of widespread public support in Canada for the internationalist ideals that underlay the League of Nations and the United Nations. Canadians were also influenced by American policy which promoted the UN, at least in part, as a means of preventing a 
return by the United States to isolationism. King's acceptance 
of Canadian participation in the UN was due less t o any 
7. quoted in Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict,2, p.407. memo. for the P.M. DEA file 52-c-s-1. 
8. Ignatieff, The making of a peacemonger, 76 . 
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conversi0n t0 belief in c0llective security than to the knowledge 
that it would be alm0st imp0ssible to resist the powerful trend 
towards creating a new and m0re effective international 
Grganisation to ensure peace. 
Louis St Laurent, L.B. Pearson and Escatt Reid were at the head 
of a group 0f policy makers wha thought that Canada sh0uld make 
the greatest possible contributian to shaping the p0st-war 
world. The weakness 0f the European econ0mies and the strength 
Gf the Canadian gave Canada a relatively strong and potentially 
influential positiGn. Reid had hoped that the United Nati0ns 
OrganizatiGn would be a system of w0rld government that would not 
anly pr0vide security, but also all0w a country such as Canada to 
have s0me influence in international affairs. At the San 
Francisca Conference Gf 1945, King ensured that Canadian effGrts 
were directed toward limiting the power of the security council 
and minimising the degree nati0nal s0vereignty be 
surrendered. The most p0sitive Canadian c0ntribution at that 
cenference was in drafting Chapter 10 ef the Charter - the basis 
for the United Nations EconGmic and SGcial Council. 
Mackenzie King's resistance to schemes fGr centralizatiGn 0f 
the Empire, c0llective security, or for world g0vernment was 
based on a deep seated distrust of any system which relied 0n a 
surrender of s0me degree of natiGnal sovereignty in order t0 
achieve a better ordering 0f state relations. King's refusal to 
participate in, 0r make commitments t0, Imperial defence was not , 
- 19 -
as many believed, due t0 any latent dislike 0f British 
c0nnecti0ns. In fact, King thought of himself as being 
British[9] and saw autenomous c0ntr0l Gf external pelicy as a 
lGgical outgr0wth from self-government and n0t as semething that 
w0uld weaken the Empire. Only grudgingly did King all0w Canada t 0 
take a pr0minent p0siti0n in the UN (in 1948 she was elected t0 
the Security Ceuncil) and he centinually w0rried that thr0ugh the 
UN, men such as Pears0n w0uld lead the c0untry int0 tr0uble in 
places where Canada had n0 immediate interests. An attempt by 
King t0 withdraw Canada fr0m the C0mmissi0n supervising the 
K0rean elections precipitated a near crisis in Cabinet the 
Prime Minister apparently asked his Ministers hew many divisi0ns 
iht. they were prepared t 0 send t0 K0rea. [10] One 0fAaims 0f pelicy 
makers at External Affairs was t0 use Canada's influence, first 
through the United Natiens, until the ineffectiveness of the 
Security Ceuncil became apparent, and then thr0ugh a regienal 
security gr0uping, a system ef erdering state relations in which 
Canada's p0sition in relati0n to the great p0wers, particularly 
the United States, weuld not be insignificant . King, h0wever, 
was n0t interested in gaining what c0uld 0nly be limited 
influence in affairs on the basis of an essentially unlimt ed 
commitment to fight in foreign wars. 
9. Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict,2,p.12. 
10. Ignatieff, The making of a peacemonger , p . 101. 
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Canada had never displayed the same non-committal attitude in 
in her external ecanomic relations as she had in defence 
matters. Since Confederation in 1867, there had been little 
reluctance t o press for influence and independence of action in 
economic matters. This is perhaps not surprising when it is 
considered that while little positive action was required on the 
part of Canada to ensure that her defence interests were met , 
the same was not true in a field where changes in British or 
American trade policy were always of direct and immediate 
consequence to Canada's well being. 
Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Canada's 
external economic relations were characterised by divergent 
trends: firstly of seeking advantages through trade within the 
Empire and secondly of pursuing freer trade with the United 
States. The Canadian ecanomy had always been heavily dependent on 
the export of primary products and thus sensitive t a any 
restrictians in the international exchange of goods. Before 
Britain moved t owards free trade , the success of the Canadian 
timber industry depended upon preferential treatment in Britain . 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the United States was looked to as 
an export market. British North America enjoyed relative 
prosperity from 1854 to 1866 when the American market was opened 
up by the "Reciprocity Treaty", entailing reciprocal reductions 
in trade barriers across a wide range of goods. The treaty was 
cancelled by a protectionist American administrati0n, and there 
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were many Canadians whG favoured a return tG freer trade. By the 
end Gf the last century, the CGlonies were pushing Britain to 
adGpt a system of preferential trade 'within the Empire. In 1894, 
Canada called , apparently without consultatiGn with LondGn, a 
cGlonial conference to meet in Ottawa. The agenda, undGubtedly to 
the chagrin of Whitehall, made no reference t G defence and 
instead fGcussed Gn trade and communications.[11] 
Trade relations traditionally were a most contentious political 
issue in Canada since they were bound up with attachment to 
Imperial connections and fear of American dominatiGn. In the 
quarter century before the Great War, trade featured most 
prominently in pGlitical debate.[12] There was discussion in 
both countries of "commercial • 11 unHlU and "unrestricted 
reciprocity". The opposition to these schemes was led by the 
Canadian Manufacturers Association who warned of the threat pGsed 
to industries that had grown up under the protective tariffs of 
Conservative Sir John A. Macdonald's "National Policy". 
Commercial union was depicted by some as the first step towards 
pGlitical absorption by the United States - talk calculated tG 
stir the emotions of those English-speaking Canadians devoted to 
the Empire. The agreement was defeated along with the Laurier's 
Liberals in 1911. The Canadian satirist, Stephen Leacock, 
11. Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict, 1,p.46. 
12. Stacey, Canada in the age of Conflict, 1 ,p.39. 
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parodied the perception of the 1911 election by a small town in 
rural Ontario: 
on it turned issues 0f the most tremendous importance, such as whether Marip0sa should become part of the United States, and whether the flag that had waved over the school house at Tecumseh Township for 10 centuries should be trampled under the hoof of an alien invader, and whether Britons should be slaves, and whether Canadians should be Britons, and whether the farming class w0uld prove themselves Canadians."[13] 
One of the Liberal ministers defeated in that election was 
Mackenzie King, a man who faced the free trade issue again in 
1948. The lessons of 1911 were not lost on him. He st0pped, 
almost single-handedly, insistent demands from policy makers in 
Ottawa that Canada should take the initiative in negotiating a 
free trade agreement with the United States . 
Britain did net swing t0wards protectionist policies until the 
1930's. The 1 932 Imperial Economic C~mference in Ottawa led to 
the adoption in Britain of tariffs that discriminated against 
countries outside of the Empire a most unpopular act in the 
United States. The breakdown of the Imperial system became a 
primary aim of American trade policy _ through to the period when 
the North Atlantic Treaty was being negotiated . The Canadian 
Prime Minister from 1930 to 1934 was R.B . Bennett, leader of the 
Conservatives but no supporter of increased t rade within the 
Empire for its own sake. Canada suffered sever~y under the 
13. quoted in The Toronto Star 25 Leac ock,Sunshine Sketches. 
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May , 1985 . Stephen 
effects of the depression and the asseciated decline in world 
trade. Preventing a return to restrictive trade practices became 
one of the primary aims of a group· of economists whe secured a 
powerful position fer themselves in Ottawa threugh their mest 
successful management of the wartime ec0nemy. 
Once the Imperial Preferences were in place, they preved very 
difficult te rem0ve their survival threugh the General 
Agreement 0n Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is demonstrati0n ef that . 
Neither Britain ner Canada ceuld make changes te their respective 
preferential tariffs without affecting the ether. The Americans 
expected Britain to abanden preferences in return fer Lend- Lease . 
As Nerman Rebertson, then the Under-Secretary for External 
Affairs, peinted 0ut, the Americans were "really pressing for 
payment, not at the expense of the United Kingdom but at the 
expense of other parts of the Empire which enjoy a preferred 
pesi tion in the British market."[14] This was a further 
complication in trade relations in the post-war period. 
The prospect of breaking down Imperial preferences threugh a 
free trade deal with the United States pr0vided Canada with 
useful leverage -in negotiations with the Americans when JVIarshall 
Plan aid threatened to restrict Canada's European markets. Such 
adjustments in Canada's trade relations were a sensitive d0mestic 
14. q_uoted in Bothwell and English,"Canadian trade p0licy in the age ef American d0minance and British decline",p.54· 
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issue . In 1948 King suggested that these adjustments could be 
made mere acceptable politically if they were made within the 
framework of a treaty that included both the u.s. and Britain. 
The premise of improved trade could also be used to overcome 
public resistance to a military treaty. That the Treaty was 
thought of, and presented to the public in terms of possible 
economic gain is evidence of the uncertainty as to whether 
popular perceptions of the Soviet threat were such that 
traditional antipathy towards peacetime defence commitments could 
be overcome. 
Some adjustment in Canada's trade relations were almost 
inevitable in the post-war period. Previously, a deficit in 
trade w~th the u.s. had been balanced by a surplus with Britain 
and the sterling area. The dominant economic position of the 
Americans and the relative weakness of the British meant that 
Canada could no longer balance her trade by converting a sterling 
surplus into dollars. Loans and grants were made to Britain in 
order to increase exports while attempts were made to reduce 
imports from the u.s. These were only temporary solutions . The 
most influential economists advocated multilateral trading, and 
failing that, a free trade agreement with the United States. This 
was bound to be a politically explosive issue. 
During the Second World War, Canada displayed more interest in 
contributing t o the economic conduct of the Allied effort than to 
strategic military planning. The struggle t o gain membership on 
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some Gf the "C0mbined B0ards" concerned with supply, cGntributed 
te a shift in Ottawa towards viewing influence in international 
institutions as a more valuable commodity.[15] The right tG 
representatiGn was claimed by Canadians en the basis Gf 
cGmpetence Gr relative strength in a particular field - this was 
described by them as the "functiGnal principle ". [16] Canada was 
also active in planning the post-war ec0nomic structure in such 
institutions as the International MGnetary Fund, the United 
Nations Bank of Reconstruction for DevelGpment, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[17] From this perspective, King's 
suggestion in the spring of 1948 that s0me of Canada's trade 
difficulties might be resolved through the North Atlantic Treaty 
seems less surprising. 
It has been nGted by C.P.Stacey that Canadian external pGlicies 
from 1921 to 1948 were, tG a remarkable extent, the pGlicies Gf 
Gne man - Mackenzie King. A goGd part Gf the explanation for this 
lies with the fact that, as an 0rganizatien, the Canadian 
gGvernment was relatively tiny until the Sec0nd Werld War . In the 
1920s, Mackenzie King ran what was essentially a one-man fGreign 
Gffice - in 1925 -there were only three administrative Gfficers in 
15. Granatstein, A man Gf influence, p.139. 
16 . Anglin , "Canadian P0licy t0wards international institutiGns",p.v. 
17 . Cuff and Granatstein, 
Prosperity,p.15-16. 
American 
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the Department . He was directly responsible f or External Affairs 
unti l 1946 when that portfolio was separated from the Office of 
the Prime Minister and given to Louis St Laurent . 
After the second world war, King faced a civil service headed 
by a relatively young and tightly knit group of men who had been 
recruited between the wars. Almost all had university educations 
and many, including Pearson, Reid, Wrong, and Robertson , had 
studied at Oxford or Cambridge. As was n0t uncommon, the 
experience of study in Britain produced a heightened sense of 
Canadian nationalism and to a questioning of the basis of 
Imperial ties.[18] This group of policy makers were not nearly 
so concerned as King about the maintenance of ties with Britain 
or about danger of American domination. They were generally 
sympathetic to the Liberal internationalism preached by Americans 
such as Cordell Hull. The economists in particular strongly 
favoured world wide multilateral trading as a means of ensuring 
that Canada could maintain her exports at a high level . The men 
who held the senior positions in the Department of External 
Affairs in the 1940s had gained their experience in the inter-war 
years when national sovereignty was seen as barrier to peaceful 
relations. Their belief in the value of collective security 
underlay their support for the North Atlantic Treaty . They did 
not share the "dated" perceptions 0f .King, who was much m0re 
18. Granatstein,The Ottawa men , p . 7 and 79 . 
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conscious of the fact that ties with Britain made Canadian 
neutrality in the event of a third European war impossible . St 
Laurent and Pearsan considered Canada ' s contribution in the 
Second World War to have been based on principle and not any 
sentimental attachments.[19] 
The civil servants in Ottawa secured influential positions f a r 
themselves during the war as a power shifted away from the 
provinces to the federal government this process 
centralisation was begun during the depression and accelerated 
after 1939. At that time the population of Canada was only about 
eleven million and the decentralised structure had made a large 
bureaucracy unnecessary. Ottawa was , however, expected t o take a 
more active role in managing the ec onomy and the beginnings of a 
welfare state . The bureaucracy gradually became a more imp0rtant 
s ource of policy initiatives as the distinction between the civil 
servic e and the party in power began to blur . [20] Pearson's move 
from Under-Secretary to Minister was a clear demonstration 0f 
this trend . 
Mackenzie King's attitude towards international institutions 
was not well understaod by ether policy makers in Ottawa . The 
Prime Ministe r was viewed as erratic in external policy matters 
in the post- war period . Perhaps he would have been viewed as 
19 . Ignatieff, Making of a peacemonger , p . 108 . 
20 . Whitake r , The government party. 
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more predictable if others had more clearly recognised his 
distrust of international institutions based on a surrender of 
sovereignJ ty. King's apparent shifts in attitude were confusing 
to men such as Reid and Pearson, who were never certain that 
their plans would be supported. At the 1944 Civil Aviation 
Conference in Chicago, Pearson and Reid headed a Canadian team 
that made a substantial contribution on the basis of skill in 
negotiations and in producing draft proposals. A more powerful 
governing agency was Reid's aim at Chicago, but at least he was 
permitted to make a constructive contribution to the 
negotiations. This was not the case at San Francisco during the 
creation of the United Nations. He was frustrated by King, who 
insisted that Canada not take a leading position on any 
contentious issue.[21] King was possibly more consistent than 
policy makers at the Department of External Affairs believed, but 
the assumptions upon which he was acting were not shared by some 
of the younger policy makers. In King's experience, a commitment 
to collective defence meant dependency on an external authority . 
He had not battled all his life against Imperial federation to 
see Canada become subservient to the United Nations or to any 
other system which relied upon centralised authority. 
Where practical economic matters were at stake, King was not 
adverse t o Canada playing a prominent international role, but he 
21 . Reid , On duty , p . 18 . 
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never placed faith in arrangements that could draw the country 
into war anywhere in the world. Although Canadian policy makers 
wedded to the ideals of the UN may not have recognised it, King 
viewed participation in the North Atlantic Treaty as 
fundamentally different to a commitment to a world-wide system of 
collective security. Canadian interests lay in the north 
Atlantic region. In the event of war in Europe, Canadianiwould, 
in all probability, wish to join the struggle at the side of the 
western Allies. The Treaty entailed a formal commitment, but at 
least it was restricted to a region where she had informal 
defence ties. More importantly, Canadian participation was 
contingent upon the Americans making a similar commitment and 
this was the most effective means to meet any threat to European 
security. 
In ~ 1948 Canada was asked, in peacetime, to join a military 
alliance. In some ways, participation in an Atlantic pact would 
have been completely unprecedented. Canada had never before 
entered formal defence arrangements and had never made a real 
contribution to even her own defence outside of the major wars. 
The Treaty provided a means of reconciling traditional 
attachments to Britain with a new post-war defence and economic 
relationship with the United States. Canada was forced to adjust 
to a d6lminant American economy and was being drawn into 
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co-operation with her neighbour in the defence of the North 
American continent - something that was be a clear demonstration 
that a new relationship with the United States had come into 
existence. These developments were not readily acceptable to 
Canadians devoted to Commonwealth ties or to isolationism. 
Canada's interest in the Treaty's non-military provisions 
reflected a traditional concern for trade relations and a fear 
that participation in a mere military alliance would be 
politically unacceptable. The willingness to embark upon a 
course of action for which a domestic consensus was uncertain is 
evidence that Mackenzie King was deeply worried by the threat of 
war in Europe and that he attached great importance to an 
American commitment to the defence of western Europe. It is 
evidence as well that the Prime Minister was being swayed by the 
internationalist aims of a group of Canadian policy makers who 
were not content to leave the world arena to the great powers. 
Mackenzie King, however, refused to pursue any policy which could 
not find a political consensus. Thus while he remained as Prime 
Minister, Canada's attitude towards the North Atlantic Treaty was 
by no means fixed. 
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Chapter 2 
Summer 1947 te 11 March 1948 
Between the summer ef 1947 and March 1948 Canadian external 
pelicy was shaped by the threat of war in Eurepe and the belief 
that demestic epinion weuld would lead Canada once again to make 
cemmon cause with France and the United Kingdem. The severity ef 
the European situatien was made clear to Mackenzie King during a 
visit te Londen in November 1947. The internationalists at the 
Department of External Affairs seught to meet that threat by 
advocating that the United Nations be reformed or supplemented to 
provide an effective system of collective security. Although 
Mackenzie King distrusted the UN, he was interested in an 
arrangement through which the Americans would guarantee the 
defence of western Europe. Canada might also participate, but not 
as part of a Commonwealth grouping. King was not prepared to 
enter a situation were the great powers did not accept the lion's 
share of any defence obligations , nor did he desire to see Canada 
defending areas of the world where she had no immediate 
interests . Clement Attlee's 10 March proposal for an Atlantic 
pact satisfied these conditions. Of equal importance to King's 
reaction to the proposal was that the Cemmunist coup in 
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CzechGslovakia Gf February 1948 had created in Canada a d0mestic 
political environment favourable to a regional defence pact. 
Thus Gn 11 March King made, what for him, was a rather dramatic 
decisi0n; he accepted an invitatiGn from the British Prime 
Minister to j0in secret discussiens with the United Kingd0m and 
the United States that wGuld eventually lead to the Nerth 
Atlantic Treaty . 
Mackenzie King was under pressure frGm within his own 
gevernment to all0w Canada to participate in the creation of a 
mere effective system of cellective security. He tolerated the 
internati0nalist aims ef Louis St Laurent, the Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, the Under-Secretary, and 
EscGtt Reid , a senier Gfficer in the Department, largely because 
of the level Gf public support for the activities and ideals of 
the UN. Frem King's perspective, there were advantages to be had 
from channelling Canadian interest in collective security into an 
Atlantic pact. The internationalist aims of the Department of 
External Affairs could be restricted t o the 0ne region of the 
w0rld where Canadians might support a peacetime military 
commitment. The dominance of American military and economic 
p0wer was forcing Canada t 0 make politically difficult 
adjustments in her relations with both Britain and the United 
States. Such a pact would facilitate some ef those adjustments . 
By working within framework of the United Nations, the popularity 
of that organisation could be drawn upon in the event that Canada 
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agreed to join an regional pact . If isolationism could not be 
overcome disappmintment ceuld be offset by pointing t m cmntinued 
participation in the UN. 
Internationalist Ideals 
In the nine months preceeding March 1948, considerable interest 
was displayed by members of the Department of External Affairs in 
making the UN a more effective instrument of collective 
security . This interest was based in part on internationalist 
ideals which were prominent in the minds of St Laurent, Pearsmn 
and Reid. That peace could ensured thrGugh new and more powerful 
international institutimns and that natimnal sovereignty was a 
barrier to smooth relati ons were ideas that commanded widespread 
intellectual an popular suppmrt. The fact that the thinking of 
certain members of the Department of External Affairs was shaped 
by these ideas was perhaps less surprising than the fact that 
internati<:malist -ideals found expressimn in the cGuntry's 
policies . Domes tic political consideratiens underlay this . The 
cmntroversy associated with appearing to follow a British or 
American line t oo c l osely could be avoided through the UN . Senior 
Canadian officials who did not share the Prime Minister's 
apprehensions about international cemmitments, were able t e play 
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a prominent role in world affairs through the UN, in part because 
of the level of public support for that institution and the 
ideals upon which it was based . 
Through the late summer and early autumn of 1947, members of 
the Department of External Affairs put forth various schemes for 
reforming er supplementing the UN . Pearson has recalled that King 
was not kept in close touch with these developments.[1] The old 
Prime minister was apparently content to give St Laurent and his 
Department some freedom to pursue their own ambitions . Reid was 
strongly influenced by the belief that national sovereignty was a 
barrier to peace. In August he presented a lecture, with the 
permission of St Laurent and Pearson , which proposed a security 
organisation with "teeth" ; the members would po ol all of their 
economic and military resources and there would be no great power 
veto.[2] Later in the same month Reid , prop~ed further plans to 
organise the West on a federal basis. The Soviet Union was in ne 
posi tion , he believed "t0 st&p the western world fr0m changing 
the specialized agencies [ of the UN] into international federal 
institutions to deal with the international economic and social 
questions . "[3] This was further than St Laurent was prepared t0 
1. Eayrs , In Defence of Canada,4,p.26. 
2 . Soward, Canadian external policy,p.81 . 
3. IVIG31 E46 v.6, "The United States and the Soviet Union: A study 
of the possibility of war and some of the implications for Canadian policy", by Reid 30 Aug.1947. 
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g0: "I would not care t0 state as a matter 0f policy •.• that the 
specialized agencies should be 
institutions."[4] ThrGughout 
turned into international federal 
the negotiation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, Reid found that his internationalist schemes 
were often t0o ambitiGus to find support even within the 
Department of External Affairs . 
St Laurent firmly believed in supporting an effective system of 
collective security. In a speech delivered by him at the UN in 
September, he indicated that Canada might favour radical revision 
of the Charter or the creation Gf a supplementary regional 
security system. Pears0n and Reid had drafted the speech and it 
reflected Reid's preference for a supplementary arrangement. 
Little immediate impression was made with the countries tGwards 
which it had been directed, but it did bring Canadians into 
contact with the British and Americans wh0 were becoming 
increasingly concerned with meeting the Communist threat in 
EurGpe. 
Less than one month later, it became known in Ottawa that the 
State Department was also interested in security arrangements 
designed t o supplement the UN . Reid f or <me was "extremely 
interested to learn" that Mr Hickerson was "almost convinced that 
the time had come t 0 give effect" to the suggestion 
4 . MG31 E46 v.6,30 Aug . 1947. 
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"f0r a grouping 0f the m0re 0r less like-minded countries inside 
the United Nations".[5] Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador in 
WashingtGn believed that this was an idea to which the Americans 
might turn "if negGtiatiGns g0 very badly with the Russians".[6] 
After the United States had demonstrated its interest, King 
permitted Canadian policy to proceed in the same directiGn . On 
17 OctGber 1947, he publicly suggested that "perhaps those 
members of the United Nations who are willing t0 accept m0re 
specific international obligatiGns in return for greater national 
security will have t0 consider whether they should not be 
prepared t o agree to a treaty of mutual defence against any 
aggress0r ." [7] Reid was pleasantly surprised by this statement: 
the "Prime Minister has been even more specific than JVIr . St. 
Laurent in his reference to the p0ssibility Gf the States of the 
Western w0rld entering into a treaty of mutual defence against 
the Soviet Union ." [B] Thr0ugh his drafting efforts Reid hoped t 0 
influence Canadian policy at a time when an American initiative 
was expected within the near future.[9] Reid prepared a draft 
"Treaty for Greater national Security". It was based Gn the 
5 . JIIIG31 E46 v .6 Reid t o Wrong, 20 Oct . 1947. 
6. Soward, Canadian External Policy , p .82 . 
7 . ibid,p . 82. 
8. JIIIG31 E46 v.6 , 20 Oct . 1947. 
9 . Reid , Time of fear and h0pe , p.34 . 
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internationalist belief in the effectiveness of a powerful 
central authority to that end· a "Bmard of Collective 
Self-Defence" with weighted voting was proposed. 
The interest displayed by Canadian officials in creating more 
effective security arrangements through the UN undoubtedly 
encouraged the British to make proposals of their own along these 
lines. King's opposition to any defence arrangements based on 
the Commonwealth was clear; the Canadians might, however, be 
attracted by regional arrangements within the UN. In New York on 
21 November 1947 Gladwyn Jebb spoke with George Ignatieff of the 
Department of External Affairs. Jebb's proposals indicated that 
Britain's primary aim was to attract the Americans into accepting 
an ebligation te defend western Europe: "a regi0nal arrangement 
providing for collective self-defence w0uld have necessarily to 
include the United States if it were to be effective in 
containing Soviet expansion."[10] By December, interest at the 
State Department in new security arrangements had increased. 
According to Wrong, Dean Rusk 11 seemed to think that it was 
possible that a proposal regarding mutual defence treaties might 
be formulated by March or April". The Americans indicated that" 
t0 have the proposal presented in the proper light, ••• it might 
be presented by five or six members of the United Nations ".[11] 
10. Reid , Time of fear and hope ,p.36. 
11 . MG 31 E46 v.6,WA-3765, 3 Dec .1947 . 
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Canadian support would prebably be regarded as essential by the 
Americans if such an initiative were launched. At the Canadian 
Embassy in Washingten, R.G . Riddell had gained the impression 
that "the United States authorities were already casting about to 
see if the proposals for a Mutual Defence Treaty could not be 
brought forward from s0me source other than themselves." 
Internationalist ideals led Canadian policy only so far before 
hesitation crept in. Pearson agreed with Riddell that the 
Department e f External Affairs should not "at the present time 
take any further initiative in regard t0 the propesal" and that 
we "should cenfine ourselves to learning as much as possible 
about the intentions of the United States and the United 
Kingdom." Riddell was doubtful that there was any "over-riding 
advantage t o be gained from our being amongst those who initiated 
it."[12] Reid might have claimed that Canada could exert 
considerable influence if she made proposals early on and had 
them accepted as the basis for further discussion. Mackenzie 
King would have been quick t 0 point out that there were definite 
disadvantages associated with taking the lead in such matters 
domestic c0ntroversy was sure to ensue. In any event, he 
believed such matters to be the responsibility of the great 
powers. 
British were keenly interested in gaining external backing for 
12. MG31 E46 v.6 5 Dec. 1947. 
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European security , and in 1948, initiatives were to be expected 
from them . In December 1947 Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, 
explained to Norman Robertsen, the Canadian High Commissioner in 
London that "one difficulty was that the Americans had n0 very 
definite plan. This meant that we in the United Kingdom must 
clear our minds and produce a plan for them." Bevin suggested an 
"informal Western Federati0n with no written constituti0n. Such 
a federation would include not only the United States but the 
whole of Western Civilizati<m. "[ 13] Even the Fe reign Secretary 
was not immune from describing security in terms attractive to 
the internationalists in the United States and Canada, who 
focussed so much of their attention on the United Nations . At a 
meeting of the British Cabinet 0n 5 March 1948, the view was put 
forth that "we should work out a much wider scheme for the 
general co-operation and defence of the wh0le world outside of 
the Soviet orbit . What we should in fact be aiming at is a 
U.N.O.[United Nations Organisation] as it c0uld have been if the 
Soviet had co-operated . "[14] 
That King was not yet ready to enter a new security arrangement 
was made clear in . his response to a message fr0m Attlee's who 
claimed , in January 1948, that the time had come "to take a more 
active line against CGmmunism". King's oral reply delivered t o 
13. PRO CAB129/123 CP(48)6, 17 Dec . 1947 . 
14. PRO F0800/460 , 5 March 1948 . 
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the British High CornmissiGner suggested the UN as "the centre 
where all democratic and freed Gm loving countries could 
co-Grdinate their policies ".[15] King was politely indicating that the great pewers sheuld accept their full obligatiens under the Charter to provide effective security. Canada was certainly 
not going t o be drawn inte a cemmitment to Eurepean defence on her ewn or as as part ef a Cernmenwealth blec. 
Other nations may have taken Canadian activity at the United Natiens as an indication that she was ready t o participate in new 
security arrangements. While King remained in cGntrol, h0wever, the UN was n0t a completely accurate indicater of Canadian intentions. That institutien, King believed, was drawing the 
country into unfereseen difficulties . In the winter of 1947-1948 
administratiGn of Korean electiGns became a source of great 
contentien within Cabinet . According te the Prime Minister: 
The truth is eur country has no business trying to play a werld role in the affairs ef nations, the very l ocation of which our people knew little or nGthing about. So far as External Affairs is concerned, they have been allowed to run far toG much on Pearson's sele say sG •••• He is yeung, idealistic, etc.,but has not respGnsibility . I am thankful I held responsibility for External Affairs fGr as l ong as I did."[16] 
King felt "a g0od deal Gf concern with the part PearsGn takes in New York. He likes the international arena but one day it 
15. Soward , Canadian external policy,p.84. 
16. Pickersgill and Forster, The Mackenzie King record,p.140,21 Dec.1947. 
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will land us in an obligation from which we will find a great 
difficulty in being freed . "[17] King certainly did nst share the 
internationalist ideals of the Canadians who were active at the 
UN . He thought that security was a responsibility of the great 
powers since they had the veto - the sooner the UN got to work 
creating an international force (i . e . a great power force) to 
give meaning to its words, and left other things meanwhile, the 
better . [18] 
King's resistance to peacetime military commitments was well 
known. That such a commitment was not forthcoming in January 
1948 should have surprised no one, particularly not a member of 
the British Cabinet . The Canadian Prime Minister would not 
consider participation in new security arrangement in the absence 
of domestic support f or such a policy. The Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 had a strong effect on public 
opinion and convinced King that an Atlantic pact could be 
contemplated. 
Defence Considerations 
17 . ibid,p.161, 25 Feb . 1948 . 
18. ibid,p.155, 14 Jan . 1948 . 
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The decision to join the United States and the United Kingdom in exploring the possibility of a north Atlantic pact was 
motivated te a large extent by King's belief that many Canadians 
considered their own intersts to be bound up with the fortunes of Europe, and at the same time perceived collective action to defend western Europe to be of such importance that traditional 
resistance to formal military commitments could be overcome. King would not consider a security arrangement in which the Commonwealth was treated as a bloc. A north Atlantic grouping, however, treated Canada as an independent power and would enable Canada t o avoid accepting any obligations that were not also 
accepted by the United States. 
A pact that linked Canada t o both the United States and the United Kingdom offered distinct advantages over bilateral 
arrangements with either. Requests for specific commitments from 
one could be deflected by pointing t o Canada's special 
relationship with the other. In the past, this tactic had been 
used successfully against calls for Imperial defence 
co-operation. After the Second World War, it was American demands that became- increasingly difficult to resist . In January 1948, the Canadian representative on the security council was 
advised that the "difficulties of our position in relation to the United States give added significance t o our association with the 
19. MG26 J4 v.421, 27 Jan .1948. 
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Gther nati0ns Gf the British C0mrn0nwealth."[19] It was imp0rtant 
t0 maintain defence ties with Britain, but at the same time there 
were pGlitical difficulties tied t0 f0ll0wing British pGlicy too 
closely. 
Merging Canadian defence policy with that Gf the United States 
was equally unacceptable pGlitically. Thus ene of the arguments 
against participation in the RiG de Jane9~e C0nference 0n 
Hemispheric defence in August 1947 was that it w0uld be difficult 
"t0 fGrmalize participation in the United States Inter-American 
Defence arrangements when we have been unwilling t0 f0rmalize 
th0se within the C0mrnonwealth ." [20] King seught t0 ensure that 
Britain was kept in cl0se touch with North American defence 
arrangements . Commenwealth ties were imp0rtant because 
d0mestic sentiments, but they were als0 useful in deflecting 
American presure t0 make a greater cGntribution t0 North American 
defence . There was a strenger tradition among Canadians of 
considering their defence as part 0f a larger whole which 
A 
included Europe.[ NGrth Atlantic Treaty came t0 be viewed as 0ne 
means e f c0untering this emphasis on static home defence . 
Ensuring that a situation did not arise in which Canada would 
be forced t 0 choose between siding with the United States 0r the 
United Kingdom was of great pGlitical significance. In the 
autumn of 1947 it was noted that "the Canadian gGvernment 
20. S0ward, "Canadian external policy" ,p. 78. 
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considers that the closest possible collaboration between the 
United States and the United Kingdom is desireable".[21] Any 
serious conflict between the two was bound to have serious 
political repercussions in Canada as isolationism clashed with 
pro-British sentiment. British and American co-operation was of 
more specific interest with regard to Newfoundland. The possible 
14 entry of the British colony into Confederation with A nine other 
p... 
Canadian provinces was prominent political issue in 1947 and 
1948. The matter was complicated by the base rights that had been 
granted to the Americans during the Second World War. Late in 
1947' it was considered that Canada, the United States and 
Britain " continue to have tripartite interest in the defence of 
Newfoundland and Labrador." The Americans had indicated a desire 
f0r long-term rights, but were respecting a Canadian "request not 
to press the matter for the time being, pending the outcome of 
Newfoundland's future political status" . [22] Within the 
framework of a treaty that included Britain, the difficulties of 
granting base rights to the Americans weuld be eased 
considerably. 
In January 1947, King's attitude towards military commitments 
remained who y negative. Despite describing a message received 
from Attlee on 14 January 1947 as "the nearest thing to a 
21. JVIG31 E46 v.6,"Joint planning with the United States",22 OctGber 1947. 
22 . ibid 
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statement of a possible approaching conflict between East and 
West that I had yet seen from the British government in 
writing."[23] The Canadian Prime Minister said little in reply 
except to c0mplain that the British were once again guilty of 
considering the Commonwealth as a unit. King was in n0 mood to 
make a positive reply. Earlier in the same day, he had been 
"shocked" by rep0rts of a speech given by the Minister of Defence 
Br<Doke ClaxtGn: 
This without a shadow of a d0ubt will be construed as 
meaning that we are committed to go to war if the 
United States is inv0lved in war. I declined, with 
respect to Britain, to adopt any such policy even t0 
the hour that Poland was invaded.[24] 
The British were considering various schemes,including one that 
sought C0mmonwealth backing for a Eur0pean security. King's 
rebuff was less significant while the primary object remained 
American support: 
Broadly speaking it d0es not matter to us essentially 
which approach the Americans should prefer so l0ng as 
they are prepared t o c0me in. What would be fatal 
would be any suggestion on the part of the Americans 
that the Western European nations should themselves 
f orm some some security system , whether based on 
Article 51 0r otherwise, without the participation of 
the United States of America.[25] 
23 . Pickersgill and Forster , The Mackenzie King record,p.155.15 
Jan . 1948. 
24. ibid,p.153,14 Jan.1948. 
25. PRO F0800/460 Message from the Foreign Office to the British 
Ambassador in Washington, 26 Jan. 1948. 
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References te the Commonwealth were carefully avoided in the next 
approach to the Canadians and Americans regarding European 
security. 
King was almost certain that in the event of a European war 
against the Soviet Union, Canadians would demand to participate; 
was "clear that it would be impossible for Canada to remain 
neutral and that positive participation by Canada on the side of 
the United States would be expected and, indeed, demanded."[26] 
This did not mean, however, that he was a agreeable to 
commitments made in advance. In the wake of the Czech coup, news 
of Soviet pressure on Scandinavia and a crisis in Palestine, King 
much more receptive to British proposals for an Atlantic security 
pact. He was apparently ready to consider joining the t wo 
countries with which Canada had defence links in a pact that 
covered the one area where Canada had a tradition of overseas 
military commitment - northwest Europe. 
Economic Considerations 
Not only in matters of defence did Canada seek to reconcile her 
26. MG26 J4 v.421, "Statement for the guidance of the Canadian permanent delegate to the United Nations and representative on 
the security council'',27 Jan.1948. 
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ties with the United States and the United KingdGm. The smlution 
t o Canada's "dollar shortage" fav0ured by the ecenomists in the 
Department of Finance and the members of the Department of 
External Affairs whe were concerned with trade relations was the 
elimination of barriers to multilateral trading. To this end, 
Jehn Deutsch and Hector McKinnon were active in the negotiation 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.The dominance of 
the American ecenomy and the relative weakness of the British 
position made the possibility of attaining free trade en a 
world-wide basis remote. The Department of Finance saw free 
trade with the United states as the only viable alternative . It 
required the least physical upheaval and weuld achieve bilateral 
balance where there had previously been a substantial deficit 
through increased exports to the United States. 
In June 1947, Norman Robertson the High Commissioner in Londen , 
and the former Under-Secretary fer External Affairs, reperted 
that pressure on the Canadian dollar positien could push the 
country into 
an impoverished sterling area held t ogether by policies of discrimination and not much more; er, 
conceivably it could result in a much closer 
continental integration of eur economy with the United States . Of these polar extremes, I much prefer the 
secend, and want to come home t o talk to you about it before the Government commits itself to the first and 
orthod ox course . [27] 
27. Robertson to Pearson, 19 June 1947 quoted in Granatstein, A 
man of influence,p.219. 
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Robertson had risen to the senior position in the Department 
through his skill and experience in trade relations ; his adviee 
was, therefore, highly valued. Neither Canada nor Britain could 
make unilateral reductions in Imperial Preferences . Any attempt 
by Canada to transform her trade relations with the United States 
required the co-operation of Britain; ensuring that the latter 
two remained on friendly terms was most valuable to Canada. 
Interest in free trade led, late 1947, John Deutsch, Director 
of the International Relations Division of the Finance 
Department, and Hector McKinnon, Chairman of the Tariff Board, to 
approach the State Department with a proposal f or very extensive 
trade reciprocity, "a comprehensive agreement involving . wherever 
possible, the complete elimination of duties " . [28] Apparently, 
this approach was made without the authority of Cabinet.[29] The 
two Canadian officials had just returned to a hero's welcome 
after an extremely successful series of negotiations in Geneva 
leading to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . The 
Americans were seeking reductions in ~ Imperial Preferences in 
return f or proceeding with the Marshall plan. In September 1947, 
an exchange .of notes between the United Kingdom and Canada was 
arranged to coincide with the signature of the General Agreement; 
the two countries undertook t o release each other from their 
28 . FRUS 1947,3 , p . 129-30 , October 1947. 
29 . Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict,2,p.419. 
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obligations under the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 to maintain 
existing margins of preference.[30] The American negotiators 
described this undertaking as "the abrogati0n of the most 
imp0rtant part of the Ottawa Agreements" and were prepared t e 
sign the GATT en 30 October 1947.[31] 
Aid delivered under the Marshall plan threatened to increase 
Canada's exchange preblems if it could be used to make purchases 
only from the United States. A similar situation had arisen in 
1941 when Canada faced the prospect of seeing "free" lend-lease 
goods drive her munitions out of the British market. [32] The 
Hyde Park agreement provided a solution whereby the lend-lease 
account was charged for materials and components imported to 
Canada but ultimately delivered to Britain. The Americans also 
agree to import enough from Canada to balance the current 
account . In 1947, Canadians were hoping for something similar to 
the Hyde Park agreement . Free trade with the United States was 
considered by many of the economists to be the most promising 
solution and one that would provide the Americans with a 
tantalising prospect while the Marshall plan appropriations were 
being determined . 
Trade discussions between Canadian and American officials 
30. Bullock, Bevin , p .462. 
31. FRUS,1947,3,p . 1014-15. 
32. Cuff and Granatstein,"Canada and the Marshall plan" , p . 201. 
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appear to have gone on for two and one half months without the 
Canadian Prime Minister being aware of them .[33 ] When he was 
finally informed on 13 January 1948, he seemed enthusiastic. 
King's well known reluctance to allow Canada a leading role in 
important international developments may have led the Finance 
Minister, Douglas Abbott,to suggest that "the proposal was not 
his but had come fasm the Americans themselves". He considered 
the agreement to be "the answer to all our present restrictions. 
If we could get complete reciprocity, ••• we would no l onger be 
dependent on uncertain markets in Europe " King recorded that 
"his own approval was strongly given. It is clear to me that the 
Americans are losing no opportunity to make their relations as 
close as possible with our country." [34] 
The t one of King's diary entry may be an indication that King 
was not as positive as he had led Abbott to believe. The "strong 
feeling in the Finance Department - Clarke, Towers[of the Bank of 
Canada] and Deutsch, who were all favourable "[35]may have 
convinced King to allow matters to develop as they may. King was 
not unaware that senior civil servants were stepping beyond their 
33. J.L. Granatstein has implied that King knew of free trade proposal in December, but no evidence was offered. Cuff and Granatstein,"The rise and fall of Canadian American free trade",p.474. C.P. Stacey found no mention of the matter in King's diary in that month. Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict,2,p.420. 
34. Pickersgill and Forster , the Mckenzie King record,4~p.260-1. 
35 · ibid 
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bounds, initiating policies without the approval of Cabinet: 
I really feel that , in these international affairs, 
matters of government, there is far too much left to a 
man like Pearson , or A. Heeney and one or two others just as in Finance , far too much is left to the Deputy Minister and one or two others, and that the real function of Cabinet is being sacrificed to some of the 
ambitions of younger men.[36] 
Early in February , King told Abbott that "he could say that he 
and I were agreed, that our Government would be prepared to 
support a treaty of the kind, should one be negotiated before 
mid-summer." It is unlikely that King believed that such a 
complex matter could be resolved in such a short time . He may 
have assented to the continuation of negotiations on the 
assumption that no agreement was possible within the proposed 
timetable. In this way the proponents of free trade could be 
left on their own - for the time being anyway. 
By early March , a detailed plan had been worked out. Some 
Americans found the proposals most attractive. In the State 
Department , it was suggested that the scheme would result in the 
immediate elimination of all Empire Preferences granted by Canada, with important political and 
economic implications for the United States while Canada would be able to make a similar offer of free trade to -the United Kingdom which would lessen the likelihood of British opposition to the proposal. Postponement would incur a serious risk that conditions 
would so change that we would l ose a unique opportunity to knit the two counties together an objective of 
36. ibid,p.157-8, 5 Feb . 1948 . 
37. FRUS,1948,9, 406-9. 
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United States policy since the founding of the Republic.[37 ] 
Thus , at the time of the decision .to join discussions leading 
to a security pact, dramatic changes in Canada's economic 
relations with both Britain and the United States were being 
contemplated. 
Domestic Political Considerations 
King's reluctance , before March 1948, even to contemplate 
participation by Canada in new security arrangements was based, 
to the greatest extent, on domestic political considerations -
isolationism and resistance to peace-time military commitments 
remained strong and were a threat to the Liberal's small majority 
in the House of Commons . St Laurent, Claxton, and Pearson were 
pushing King away from an isolationist position . [38 ] and by 10 
March, the Prime Minister had evidently judged that public 
perceptions had changed to an extent that made participation in 
an Atlantic pact politically feasib l e. Working within the United 
Nations it would be possible to claim that Canada was accepting 
no new obligations while an arrangement that included the United 
States and the United Kingdom might be useful in solving the 
38 . Pickersgill , My years with Louis St Laurent , p . 45 . 
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political problems associated with maintaining defence and 
economic ties with those two powers. 
The clash between Britain and the United states over Palestine 
placed Canada in a difficult position in February 1947. King 
stressed the point "that if , in addition to it being alleged that 
we were being dominated by the United States on economic matters, 
we were being dominated as well on military matters , we would 
have a hard battle to face in our country." [ 39 ] 
King clearly recognised that new military commitments were 
bound to give rise to domestic cont roversy. The Minister of 
Defence gave a speech in January implying that Canada was 
prepared to join with the United States in the defence of North 
America. The Prime Minister believed that "we may have, when 
Parl iament reassembles, one of the most difficult debates we have 
ever had, throwing into the fire, the fat of Canada's commitment 
to go to war in advance on the mere ground of our sharing a 
continent in common" with the United States . [ 40 ] 
By March, a threatening European situation led to a change in 
attitude: "I do not recall prior to the last great war reading 
any dispatches that seemed seemed t o me as serious and solemn as 
39 . Pickersgill and Forster , The Mackenzie King record , 4,p.163. 20 Feb.1948. 
40 . ibid , p . 154,14 January 1948. 
41 . ibid , p . 166 , 10 March 1948 . 
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those I have received today".[41] The Canadian people might be 
ready to make a commitment after all . Isolationism in French 
Canada was off-set to a certain extent by anti- communist 
sentiment associated with strength of Catholicism . On the same 
day that Attlee's message was received, King questioned St 
Laurent on the Italian elections and on the Pope's pronouncement 
that voting for the Communists was a sin. The External Affairs 
Minister "thought that the people took the religious aspect much 
more lightly in Italy than they did in our country" . [42] The 
Prime Minister believed that "if Britain and the United States 
were drawn into war with Russia, nothing could keep the country 
out". Meeting with St Laurent , Pearson, and Claxton, King 
determined that it was "desirable to agree to explore the 
situation . \ . v1s- a-v1s the Regional Atlantic Pact of Mutual 
Assistence under Section 51 of the Charter and that I should so 
advise Attlee . "[43] Working within the UN, King could always 
claim that Canada was accepting no new obligations and none that 
were not also accepted by the permanent members of the Security 
Council, most importantly, the United States . The UN might 
provide a useful escape hatch if participation in a regional 
arrangement was politically unacceptable; it could always be 
claimed that Canada was already a member of the General Assembly 
and that security was the responsibility of the great powers . 
42. ibid , p . 166 . 10 March 1948. 
43. ibid ,p.166. 10 March 1948 . 
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As yet, King had only agreed to send a Canadian official to 
Washington "to explore the situation" · He was careful "to make 
no commitment" and to make clear that "the cabinet would have a 
knowledge of what was proposed before any final decisions reached 
as to what we world do."[44] A thorough appraisal of the domestic 
political situation was necessary. King immediately proceeded to 
do just this. He found that the leader of the Conservatives and 
the leader of the Social Credit party both agreed that the 
European situation was very serious. 
King's decision to send a Canadian official to join security 
discussions wi th the United States and the United Kingdom, must 
have been based on a belief the European situation appeared 
sufficiently threatening and that enough Canadians considered 
their own security to be bound up with that up that of western 
Europe to overcome traditional resistance to defence 
commitments. A north Atlantic grouping was a useful way of 
resolving political difficulties associated with defence and 
economic ties with Britain and the United States and by working 
within the framework of the UN, the political difficulties of 
entering a new arrangement might be avoided. 
44 · ibid 
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Even in the absence of a firm commitment, the 10 March decision 
to join security discussions was dramatic step for King. Canada 
had never entered into a formal commitment to come to another 
nation's defence. Even the weak pledges of assistance associated 
with the League of Nations and United Nations were greatly 
distrusted by King. Still, if the public demanded participation 
in those institutions, King was willing to accept them. New 
security arrangements could usefully be pursued within the 
framework of the UN, drawing upon its popular support to minimise 
domestic controversy. Canadian activity at the UN, of which King 
was so disparaging, and public support for it were based to a 
certain extent on the same internationalist ideals. Pressure 
both from within the Government and from outside the country for 
participation in a regional security pact could be more easily 
managed within the framework of the United Nations. As the threat 
of war grew in Europe King would weigh the political difficulties 
associated with entering an arrangement designed to prevent war 
against the upheaval that would follow a third great European war 
in this century. A~ doubts that King may have harboured were 
unlikely to be readily apparent: 
He skillfully avoided what was wrong 
Without saying what was right, 
And he never let his on the one hand 
- 57 -
, 
Know what his on the other hand was doing . 
[45] 
45 . Scott , Selected poems , p . 60- 61 . 
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Chapter 3 
11 March to 30 June 1948 
Mackenzie King agreed on 11 March 1948, to join the United 
States and the United Kingdom in discussions leading to a 
security pact, but he had not yet assessed the attitude within 
his own party. That was done on 17 March, following a broadcast 
by President Truman declaring American support for the Brussels 
Treaty which had been signed that day. That Treaty was 
considered by the British as a necessary preliminary to gaining 
an American commitment to western European security.[1] Secret 
talks leading to an Atlantic pact began in Washington on 22 
March. Until July, only three countries were directly involved in 
the security discussions; the Canadian representative, L.B. 
Pearson, enjoyed a prominent position to advocate a multilateral 
treaty against alternatives such as a unilateral declaration by 
the President. The Americans were unable to proceed without the 
support of the Senate and the Vandenberg resolution was 
introduced in May 1948 as a means of gaining tacit consent for 
proceeding with the development of security matters. After the 
resolution won acceptance on 11 June 1948, the negotiations were 
1 . Bullock, Bevin , p.573. 
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able to resume in July with Canada and the members of the 
Brussels Treaty . No firm ~ction was expected from the Americans, 
however, until after the Presidential election in November. The 
United States was not the only country to reveal resistance to 
entangling alliances; the refusal of the Canadian Cabinet to 
contribute to the Berlin airlift at the end of June, demonstrated 
that the country was not yet ready be drawn into a threatening 
European si tuat ion . 
Internationalist Ideals 
In the spring of 1948, Canada's attitude toward a north 
Atlantic pact was shaped, through the influence of St Laurent, 
Pearson, and Reid, by internationalist ideals. Those three men 
believed that Canada could make a significant and positive 
contribution to international affairs through a suitable 
framework, such as the one provided by the UN . They were anxious 
to ensure that Canada was not left out of a new defence 
arrangement which aimed to create an effective system of 
collective security where the Security Council had failed. King I 
tolerated the internationalist aims of the Department of External I 
Affairs largely because of the widespread public support for the 
UN and its ideals. While new security arrangements remained 
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within the framework of the UN, King could draw upon the UN's 
popularity if Canada agreed to join an Atlantic pact. If, on the 
other hand, the political costs of a new commitment were too 
great, Canada's more general obligations as a member of the UN 
could be used to defuse any disappointment . 
Mackenzie King's interest in using the United Nations as the 
basis for a more effective system of security was apparent in his 
meeting with the Prime Minister of Belgium: "I found that Spaak 
agreed very much about the United Nations not being what it 
appeared to be and the necessity of agreements using the 
United Kations as a frame. Basing actions on its principles but 
not counting on it for strength."[2] He did not expect that 
Canada would accept any substantial obligations under such an 
agreement; security was a responsiblity of the great powers. 
King's reaction to the first reports from the Washington talks 
was that it "seems to me every way best that the whole matter 
should be one of United States leadership. It puts increasingly 
on the United States the obligation of maintaining peace in the 
Atlantic."[3] 
Pearson and Reid shared none of the Prime Minister's 
apprehensions about placing Canada in the forefront of . such 
matters. Reid had t o struggle to gain support -for his broad 
2. ibid, p.185. 17 April 1948. 
3 . ibid, p.181. 26 March 1948 . 
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internationalist aims even within the Department of External 
Affairs. Some policy makers such as Hume Wrong and A.D.P. Heeney 
were advocates of collective security, but considered some of 
Reid's proposals to be too ambitious to be of any use. One of 
his aims was the creation of a more effective international 
authority: 
we should go farther than the Brussels Treaty in 
setting up revolutionary new political instruments of 
the Alliance. That is why I feel that we should have 
not only a board for Collective Self-Defence, but a parliament, a president, a chancellor and a chief of 
staff. This would give the impression that we mean business when we talk about forming a new society of 
the free nations.[4] 
Heeney, the Secretary to Cabinet, recoiled from such an omnibus 
scheme as Reid envisaged at that stage: "Surely the u .s.s.R. and 
friends would be more impressed by a quick business-like 
arrangement between the U.K.-U.S.-Canada and France and the 
Western Union than by an amorphous conglomeration which 
included Finland,Portugal and Pakistan."[5]The British call to 
organise the "ethical and spiritual forces of Western Europe 
backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and 
Americas"[6] had struck a responsive chord with Reid. He was 
attracted by the notion of including the self-governing members 
of the Commonwealth, particularly the new Asian Dominions. King 
4 . MG31 E46 v . 6, Reid to Pearson, 18 March 1948. 
5. ibid, Heeney to Reid, 18 March 1948. 
6 . Pearson, 11Canada and the origins of NATd: p.3. 
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had little use for arrangements that looked suspiciously like the 
schemes for Imperial federation that he had spent his long career 
fighting against. 
In an effort to have his ideas accepted as the basis of policy, 
Reid argued that he was proposing nothing that was not also being 
considered by the Americans. He claimed that the "State 
Department view was, apparently, that while the Western Union 
project was most welcome, Mr. Bevin's proposals lacked breadth 
and imagination." Some in the State Department "have visions of 
a much more extensive union, perhaps with common 
citizenship".[?] Reid was turning the American arguments for a 
"United States of Europe" around, and using them to build a case 
for a north Atlantic federation. Ernest Bevin, like King, 
believed that schemes based on a surrender of sovereignty were 
dangerous. King's battles had been fought against Imperial 
federation. Bevin resisted American pressure for a united Europe 
and later on, he opposed on similar grounds, Canadian proposals 
for new supra-national institutions. 
Pearson and Reid sought to convince King that security matters 
could not simply be left in American hands if arrangements were 
to take a form satisfactory to Canada (and incidently to their 
own internationalist aims). A multilateral treaty was preferable 
from many points of view. Pearson noted that : 
7 . MG31 E46 v.6,22 March 1948. 
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One reason why we need an Atlantic Union is that we 
must establish in peacetime some international 
constitutional machinery which could be used in wartime 
as the basis for a supreme war command ... . The 
existence of some sort of constitutional machinery 
enables governments which have wisdom and maturity to 
have a greater influence on the formulation of policy 
than would be warranted by their power alone . [8] 
Such reasoning could not be used with King. He had purposely 
avoided associating himself with the military direction of the 
last war in order to evade domestic controversy. 
The Prime Minister was well aware that the Department of 
External Affairs favoured taking what he considered too prominent 
a role in world affairs: 
More and more I feel I would like to get out of 
office before any new schemes are brought forward which 
I shall have to endorse or oppose. There is more than 
enough to handle at the present without creating more 
machinery, giving the bureaucrats everywhere more in 
the way of power without responsiblity . What most of 
these schemes come down to is allowing a body of men 
who have the most favoured positions in the Civil 
Service to become a world law-making and governing body 
without in any way having to gain office through the 
will of the people themselves.[9] 
Reid's proposal for an Atlantic Parliament was just the sort of 
scheme that was anathema to King . 
The Department of External Affairs attempted to push policy in 
the direction of its own broad internationalist aims through 
8 . MG31 E46 v . 6, Pearson to Wrong and Reid . 21 May 1948 . 
9 . King Diaries , 16 April 1948 . 
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public pronouncements . King accepted public discussion of 
security arrangements in terms of the ideals of the United 
Nations because it was politically useful to do so . A speech 
presented by St Laurent in the House of Commons in April was 
intended to present the arguments for Canadian partici pation in a 
collective security pact.[10] It was aimed in part at the 
opponents of the idea of an Atlantic pact in the State 
Department . [11 ] The State Department apparently gained the 
impression that the Canadians were pursuing broad 
internationalist aims : "In light of these statements [by St 
Laurent ] and of Mr Bevin's memorandum , I think we must be careful 
not to place ourselves in the position of being the obstacle to 
further progress toward the political union of the western 
democracies . "[12] Bevin sent a powerful message urging the 
resumption of negotiations.[13] Their own preoccupation with a 
European federation possibly led the Americans to interpret the 
British and Canadian calls for a American participation in a 
multilateral treaty as interest in 
internationalist influence apparent 
a 
in 
federation . The 
the Canadian 
pronouncements would have done little to dissuade them of this 
perception . 
10 . House of Commons Debates, 48, v.4, p -3449-50 . 
11 . Rei d , Time of fear and hope , p . 77 . 
12 . MG31 E46 v . 6 , State Department Document , 24 May 1948 . 
13 . Bullock , Bevin , p . 569 and FRUS1948 , 3 , p . 122- 3 . 
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Developing security arrangements within the framework of the 
United Nations was a useful means of mobilising domestic support 
both in Canada and the United States . The Vandenberg resolution, 
introduced on 11 May drew upon popular dissatisfaction with the 
preformance of the Security Council. Arthur Vandenberg himself, 
believed that the resolution provided the President with the 
necessary support to enter a security arrangement that lived 
"within the Charter but outside the veto". [ 14 ] The British 
recognised that this interest had to be tapped if they were to 
attract the Americans: "London discussions on Germany have shown 
that the presence of United States forces in Germany alone is not 
sufficient to remove French fears about their own security . A 
treaty based on Article 51 of the Charter to which the United 
States would be a party would be the best answer to those urging 
revision of the Charter." [ 15 ] French fears of a revived Germany 
had to be quelled before western Europe could make an effective 
recovery and defend itself against Communism . 
King favoured keeping security within the United Nations . 
Public support . for internationalist ideals might usefull y be 
drawn upon if Canada entered an Atlantic pact. If she did not , 
existing obligations under the Charter could be used to offset 
14 . Vandenberg , The private papers of senator Vandenberg , p.419 . 
15 . MG31 E46 v . 6 , summary of UK view sent to UK ambassador in Washington, 22 May 1948. 
- 66 -
J 
any disappointment . Thus King tolerated the internationalist 
ambitions of members of External Affairs largely because it was 
useful f or domestic political reasons to do so . 
Defence Considerations 
Defence considerations formed the basis for arguments used by 
the internationalists at the Department of External Affairs to 
convince both their own Prime Minister and the Americans that a 
multilateral treaty was superior to any alternative 
arrangements . One of the strongest arguments was that only 
through such a treaty could Canada resolve some of the domestic 
problems associated with her defence ties with the United States 
and the United Kingdom . European security itself was important , 
but no Canadian commitment would be forthcoming in the absence of 
favourable domestic conditions . 
King was not about to accept any obligations on behalf of 
Canada that were not also accepted by the United States . He felt 
strongly that " the big powers , particularly the United States , 
should be kept promi nently i n the van . It would be a mistake to 
make ourselves a sort of apex t o a movement which would be 
- 67 -
- - ---
-- . . ~ 
'. 
linking together u.s. and U. K. and other nations in a project 
that is i ntended to offset the possiblity of immediate war with 
Russia . "[16 ] 
The political dangers of being drawn into an intimate defence 
relationship with the United States, were clearly recognised in 
Ottawa : "if an agreement along the lines that were discussed 
becomes a reality, • • • it should considerably ease our problems 
in handling defence relations with the United States . "[ 17] A 
defence arrangement that included the United States and Britain 
held great attractions for Canadian policy makers : 
Ever since we have been in a position to shape our 
own policy abroad, we have had to wrestle with the 
antinomies created by our position as a North American 
country and as a member of the Commonwealth A 
situation in which our special relationship with the 
United Kingdom can be identified with our special 
relationships with other countries in western Europe 
and in which the United states will be providing a firm 
basis ••• seems to me such a providential solution for 
so many of our problems that • •• we should go to great 
l engths and even incur considerable risks in order to 
ensure our proper place in this new 
partnership.[18] 
Such arguments could not easily overcome a strong reluctance on 
King ' s part to make new commitments . He had to be convinced that 
an American unilateral declara tion was an unacceptable 
16. King di aries , 19 March , 1948 . 
17. MG26 J4 v.441 , Wrong t o Pear son , 7 April 1948. 
18 . quoted in Reid , Time of fear and hope , p . 132 . Robertson t o 
DEA 21 April 1948 . 
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alternative to a treaty and that Canadians should try to persuade 
the Americans themselves of this. Pearson suggested that it may 
be thought in the United States that a Presidential guarantee 
"will acquire the validity and authority in its field that the 
Monroe Doctrine, based also solely on a Presidential statement, 
has acquired in its field. It is also hoped that if a 
declaration were made, it could be supplemented by one from 
Canada, though why we, any more than Brazil, Argentina or 
Australia should give such a guarantee is not clear."[19] Left 
on his own, King probably would have considered a unilateral 
guarantee by the Americans as very attractive, relieving Canada 
of making any commitments herself. He had, however to contend 
with strong pressure from the Department of External Affairs for 
a treaty. 
Events at the end of June demonstrated just how weak was 
Cabinet's belief in the need to stand with the United States and 
the Brussels powers in the defence of western Europe. The Prime 
Minister was rather surprised to find that the Minister of 
National Defence did not advocate sending the Royal Canadian Air 
Force to join the Berlin airlift: 
I had expected Claxton , in the light of the 
advertising he is giving Canada's armed services 
[to] immediately say something t o the effect that they 
were ready to supply a certain number of planes with 
crew, etc. • •• Instead of that, to my amazement, he 
took the opposite view. He thought the business 
19 . MG32 B5 v . 3 , memo . for the PM from Pearson , 12 April , 1948 . 
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was much too dangerous . 
Others in Cabinet agreed with Claxton . St Laurent thought that : 
"the United States might wish us to supply them and we would have 
to consider this . " King thought that here again "I detected a 
note which is characteristic of Pears on with his close 
association with the United States . " The Prime Minister believed 
that Cabinet had seen for the first time "that I had been wise in 
the fight that I had been making right along against getting too 
quickly and easily and unnecessarily drawn into situations in all 
parts of the world which we should be extremely careful about 
assuming."[20] 
The Prime Minister ' s attitude did not sit well with Pearson who 
believed that "the trial of strength that is now going on in 
Berlin is of crucial importance . " His memorandum to St Laurent 
argued for Canadian participation in the airlift: "we may be 
making our contribution to a successful stand against the 
Russians , and, therefore, eventually to a solution to our present 
international difficulties . "[21] A Canadian contribution was 
favoured by all the senior members of the Department of External 
Affairs . [22] 
20 . Pi ckersgill and Forster , The Mackenzi e King record , 4 , p . 191 - 2 . 30 June 1948 . 
21 . Eayrs , In defence of Canada , 4 , p . 41 - 44 · 
22 . Granats tein , A man of influence , p . 288 . 
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Despite all of the talk about collective security, when a crisis 
actually arose, traditional fears about overseas commitments 
returned . The Cabinet was not prepared to make any sort of 
contribution even in the face of considerable domestic 
criticism. [23] This certainly must have come as a shock to the 
internationalists at External Affairs. 
Economic Considerations 
Earlier in the spring of 1948 , King successfully challenged the 
internationalist aims of the Department of Finance. The 
economists, backed by the Department of external affairs 
advocated free trade. This policy was judged by King to be 
politically impossible. Interest in free trade was channeled 
into the security discussions, forming the basis for Canadian 
interest in the non-military provisions in the North Atlantic 
Treaty . 
Soon after the secret talks on an Atlantic pact began in 
Washington , King began to have serious doubts about the political 
prospects of a free trade deal : 
had a talk of some length with Abbott about trade 
23 . ibid' p . 1 93 . 
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negotiations with the u.s. Told him to read with care 
what LIFE [magazine] has on a suggested commercial 
union:--1 was relieved to hear him make clear that what 
is being criticized and what we had agreed to in our 
previous talks was not any immediate free trade but 
trade so arranged as to make possible the gradual 
integration of our systems .••• [24] 
King was aware that the Canadian press had displayed almost 
unanimous opposition to the customs union proposed in the 15 
March edition of LIFE.[25] 
King expressed his doubts more clearly to St Laurent, Howe, 
Clarke, McKinnon, and Deutsch on 22 March: 
The cry would be raised at once that it was political 
union that we were after . the Tories would say 
that this is Mr. King's toy. He has always wanted 
annexation to the States. 
An indirect approach using the alliance proposals would wiser: 
••• I felt that trade proposals might be made to fit 
as it were into the larger Atlantic Pact. That if, for 
example, the Atlantic Security Pact were agreed upon 
and were brought before Parliament and be passed as it 
certainly would be, we might immediately follow 
thereafter with trade as being something which 
helped to further the object of the Pact ••• ". [26] 
King thought it might even lead to the "United States and the 
United Kingdom coming in more in the way of greater freedom of 
trade." 
24. King diaries , 16 March 1948 . 
25. Creighton , The f orked road, p .1 55 . 
26. King diaries, 22 March 1948. 
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The economists were apparently "strongly taken with the idea" and 
there was a suggestion that the Americans might already be 
considering combining the trade and security matters.[27] 
Canadian interest in the North Atlantic Treaty's non- military 
provisions can be traced back to this suggestion from King.[28] 
Channelling the movement towards free-trade into the security 
talks provided the Prime Minister with the oppor tunity to assess 
the political prospects of such an arrangement. King doubted if 
Ilsley , the Minister of Justice or Gardiner, the Minister of 
Agriculture would support free trade . Ilsley was devoted to 
British connections and Gardiner needed the United Kingdom market 
to satisfy the prairie farmers . [29] St Laurent agreed that the 
proposal to complete a trade deal before summer was hardly likely 
to be feasible but that it might be developed before the August 
National Liberal Convention and made a plank in the platform 
. [30] 
The proponents of free trade were not easily dissuaded. Before 
27. Pickersgill and Forster , The Mackenzie King record, 4, p.264 . 
28. Granatstein has suggested that Norman Robertson had the 
original idea that led to Article 2 of the Treaty(see appendix), 
Granatstein , A man of influence,p . 237. This view appears to be 
incorrect since Robertson made no suggestion to combine trade and 
security matters until late in April . Reid , Time of fear and 
hope , p.132. 
29. Cuff and Granatstein, "The rise and fall of Canadian-American 
free trade", p.464. 
30 . King diaries, 25 March 1948 . 
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King departed on a trip to Williamsburg to meet President Truman, 
Pearson made one more attempt to change the Prime Minister's 
attitude. King was not about to rush the trade matter: " ••• it 
was decided that the United States officials should be asked to 
postpone their visit to Ottawa, as the Canadian Government did 
not wish to pursue the question further for the time being."[31] 
Pearson was undoubtedly aware, as John Deutsch was that "the 
price of a customs union with the u.s. is the loss of political 
independence in the sense that we would no longer be in effective 
control of our national policies." Deutsch thought that things 
had "changed since the reciprocity campaign of 1911, ••• Then 
reciprocity simply broadened the area of trade •••• Now we would 
inherit a vast structure of American government policy." The 
internationalists recognised that there was a price to be paid 
for what they considered a better ordering of state relations. 
That price was a loss of independence. A customs union, 
according to Deutsch, "may be a fine thing •••• But let us not 
blink the price."[32] 
The public reaction to the customs union proposed in LIFE that 
public perceptions had in fact changed very little since 1911. 
Commonwealth ties continued to be cherished and American 
31. MG26 J4 v.441, Pearson to Wrong, 31 March 1948. 
32. Cuff and Granatstein, American dollars , Canadian prosperity, 
p.67-8. 
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domination feared. The civil service was relatively united in 
its internationalist aims, and its main opponents were to be 
found among the older politicians. Deutsch considered those who 
resisted free trade to be motivated by a perverse sense of 
nationalism which now expresses itself by hating the u.s. and 
trying to kick it in the teeth . " Deutsch himself was regarded by 
some "as a poor dupe for the Americans."[33] Internationalism in 
trade matters at least, was incompatible with Canadian 
nationalism and emotional attachment to Britain. Some Canadians 
hoped that internationalist aims could be pursued through a 
regional pact which in some ways strengthened ties with the 
United Kingdom. 
King had channelled support for free trade into the proposed 
Atlantic pact and apparently was willing to use a trade agreement 
to interest the Americans in a broader alliance. As long as free 
trade was a possib~ity, the Americans would find it easier to 
keep the Canadians in mind while determining their economic 
policy . The Americans in the State Department were disappointed 
that King was hindering progress on free trade . Marshall, Lovett 
and Harriman wanted "very much to go ahead on the original 
timetable", but recognised the force of Canadian reasons for our 
delaying our decision".[34] 
33 · ibid , p . 2488 
34 . MG26 J4 v . 441 , Wrong to Pearson , 3 April , 1948 . 
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The proponents of free trade faced the problem that security 
matters were proceeding too slowly for the two to be effectively 
combined. Despite King's orders to the contrary, a free trade 
deal independent of an Atlantic treaty was kept alive until the 
Prime Minister heard through Wrong and Reid that C.D. Howe the 
American born Minister of Trade and Commerce, had been discussing 
the matter with State Department officials. According to the 
American record , Howe stated that the "Prime Minister would be 
retiring in August and there would be an election in the Spring 
of 1949 . The procedure would be to put a ffee trade plank in the 
party platform."[35] Pearson , apparently, was delighted with 
Wrong's report of the talk and he sent Howe 's remarks on to King 
with the comment that he found them "very satisfactory ".[36] 
The Prime Minister was greatly offended by what he learned and 
sought t o put an end to the matter by indicating that whether he 
was in office or out , he would openly oppose his own party over 
free trade. 
For a time , no firm commitments to either trade or security 
arrangements were made, but this policy of equivocation could not 
go on forever . The Americans were informed that there was little 
possibility of a trade deal in the immediate future. The initial 
American support for the inclusion in the Atlantic Treaty of an 
35. FRUS , 1948 , 9 , p.410-11 . 
36 . Bothwell , C. D. Howe , p . 220. 
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article referring to the need for economic co-operation was 
undoubtedly connected to their desire to conclude a trade deal . 
As that prospect receded, so did American interest in what became 
Article 2 (see appendix). The senior members of the Departments 
of Finance and External Affairs were proponents of free trade. 
The speeches of St Laurent and Pearson which shaped public 
expectations commonly dealt with the need for economic 
co-operation. By the final stages of the negotiations, the St 
Laurent and Pearson were obliged, in the interests of gaining 
domestic political support for the Treaty , to work extremely hard 
to ensure that Article 2 was not eliminated. 
Domestic Political Considerations 
During King's Premiership , no firm commitments to any policy 
were made before the domestic political situation had been 
carefully assessed. Free trade and the North Atlantic Treaty 
were no exceptions. Truman's broadcast of 17 March , declaring 
American support for the Brussels Treaty provided an oppor tunity 
for the Prime Minister to gauge the attitude of his own party 
towards the latter . At the end of April the reaction of the 
House of Commons as well as the press were carefully considered 
after a Parliamentary debate on foreign policy. The reaction of 
the Cabinet to the crisis in Berlin at the end of June was 
perhaps a more accurate indicator of true feelings towards 
overseas military commitments. The crisis revealed that, despite 
the internationalist leanings of the Ministe r and Department of 
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External Affairs, the attitude of Cabinet as a whole had changed 
very little since the summer of 1939. 
Mackenzie King considered the 17 of March to be a turning 
point, both in Canadian policy and in the West's relations with 
the Soviet Union "a memorable day in the World's history" was 
the comment in his diary. After gathering to to hear Truman's 
radio broadcast of that day, the Liberal Party caucus discussed 
the situation. To get "a consensus of opinion of the Cabinet" 
King inquired whether Canada might not declare, as the President 
had, support for western Europe . The political difficulties of 
appearing to follow an American line too closely were clearly on 
the mind of the Minister of Agriculture who "thought that in any 
statement we issued it would be better t o line up with the 
English rather than the United States." The best thing, King 
felt, would be t o take Bevin's statement of January (urging unity 
among western nations) and "show how the Brussels agreement had 
grown out of the Bevin plan, and that our attitude would be to 
help implement the purposes of the Bevin plan." 
This was immediately agreed to by King who thought that "the 
moment had come to tell the Cabinet of the communications 
received from Attlee" which had invited Canada to join in 
discussions leading to an Atlantic pact. King informed Cabinet 
that Canada was being asked to "join a regional security pact of 
which the United Kingdom, the United States and ourselves would 
be the principle persons." There was "agreement on the part of 
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all". King brought up the matter three or four times to ensure 
that "there was no dissenting • 11 VOJ.Ce • The Prime Minister 
requested Pearson and Heeney to prepare a statement to be 
delivered in the House. The influence of Pearson's own 
internationalism was perhaps too evident for King's liking 
"Much less clear type of statement than I would like to have 
made. • •• I just had to take what had been prepared as it was." 
[37] 
In the House King announced that the Brussels Treaty was "the 
partial realization of the idea of collective security ••• which 
may be followed by other similar steps until there is built up an 
association of all free states ••• "[38] Through his speech, he 
believed that "without disclosing anything ahead", he had more or 
less prepared that House as he had the Cabinet "for a Security 
Pact and, to all intents and purposes, secure[d] their tacit 
assent to Canada becoming a party thereto."[39] The significance 
of the decision to join the security talks in Washington was not 
lost on King: 
It really was if the hand of providence itself had 
guided the whole affair in a manner that saved me what 
would have been a moment in my life almost as difficult 
as at the time of Munich - or when the war came on and 
37 . Pickersgill and Forster, The Mackenzie King record, 4, 
p .1 70-74 . 
38. Soward, Canadian External Policy, p.84. 
39. Pickersgill and Forster , 
p.173. 17 March 1948. 
The Mackenzie King Record , 4, 
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the beginning of the invasion of Poland •••• 
King thought that 17 March 1948 was "a day that had its place in 
History. It is really the demarcation line between past efforts 
to adjust difficulties with the u .s.s.R. by conciliation and the 
beginning of settlement by force".[40] 
If public resistance to military commitments were to be 
overcome, great care would have to be taken to avoid stirring up 
controversy. Pearson had suggested that Quebec or Ottawa might 
be chosen as the site for negotiations leading to an Atlantic 
pact . King felt that 
••• St Laurent and I had made a mistake in even 
countenancing the idea. the real reason was that it would lead t o discussion in Quebec, throughout Canada generally, of such questions as compulsory 
service, focussing in addition on immediate prospects 
of war, uncertainty of affairs, etc. There is a danger of having Pearson take too sudden a lead in any 
matters of the kind •••• He likes keeping Canada at 
the head of everything, •••• He does not see at all 
what is involved in the way of getting Parl iament to provide what would be necessary in the way of forces 
money, etc.[41] 
The public and Parliamentary reaction to St Laurent 's speech in 
the House of Commons on April 29 was of great interest to policy 
makers in Ottawa . [42] The Minister responsible for Exte rnal 
Affairs proposed "that Canada should play her full part ••• with 
40. ibid, p.175· 
41 . King diaries , 19 March 1948. 
42 . Reid , Time of Fear and Hope , p . 106. 
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the other free states in any security arrangements which may be 
worked out under Article 51 or 52 of the Charter."[43] The 
Department of External Affairs reported that in the House of 
Commons, "there was almost unanimous acceptance of his point of 
view on Communism and the United Nations." It continued that 
"Editorially, the Canadian newspapers showed considerable 
interest in the Minister's statement. There were a number of 
criticisms, the most vigorous of which was that expressed by some 
Quebec papers that the Government was leading the country towards 
11 war. On the whole, however, "the general tone of editorial 
opinion was that the speech was a heroic event and several 
writers expressed the view that for the first time a clear 
foreign policy had emerged . "[44] The underlining was King's, and 
was probably a good indication that his support for a treaty was 
not nearly so firm as External Affairs would have liked. A clear 
foreign policy had never emerged under King's direction precisely 
because of the risks such an action entailed to his support among 
one of the two language groups. 
While the North Atlantic Treaty was under discussion, the 
Department of External Affairs was responsible for a long series 
of speeches on collective security intended in part to "educate" 
the Canadian people. From the middle of March to the middle of 
43 . House of Commons Debates, 1948,v .4, p -3449-50. 
44 . MG26 J4 v.274 , Summary analysis prepared by DEA , 29 April 1948. 
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June 1948, St Laurent was the princip~ spokesman- he gave five 
public speeches and two others i n the House of Commons . At the 
end of this period he agreed that what he had been doing could 
justly be described as "a crusade by Canada for the completion of 
a Western Union or a North Atlantic regional pact . "[45] St 
Laurent was aware that his acti vity did not suit King ' s more 
passive style . On 19 June 1948 , St Laurent declared that "there 
might be some great value in having consummated a regional pact 
[in which the] western European democracies , the United Kingdom, 
the United States and ourselves agreed to stand together, to pool 
for defence purposes our respective potentials" . [46] This 
statement went further than any issued by the the British or 
Americans [47] and immediately after presenting it in the House, 
he asked Reid, "I wonder how it will go down. 11 Re id replied "It 
will go down very well in the country. 11 St Laurent said , "I 
wasn ' t thinking of the country, I was thinking of Lauri er House 
[King's residence i n Ottawa] . "[48] As events at the end of June 
were to demonstrate , it was not only King's attitude that was 
uncertain . 
When Cabinet faced the decision of whether or not to 
----------
45 · Reid , Ti me of fear and hope , P• 77 • 
46. Re i d , Time of fe ar and hope, p . 78. 
47 · ib i d . 
48 . ibid . 
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participate in the Berlin airlift , it became clear that the 
Department of External Affairs was not firmly supported in its 
policies . St Laurent was the only Minister to believe that 
Canada might have to consider a request (which was never formally 
made by Bevin but which was reported in the press) to supply air 
transport . The Prime Minister advised St Laurent that Cabinet 
should be kept in closer touch with external policy : 
I know that Pearson, for many reasons perhaps equally [with St Laurent] dislikes having the Cabinet as a 
whole have too much of a say, discuss foreign affairs 
more than is necessary •••• This [advising that Canada 
send air transport ] is right along the lines that 
External Affairs has been taking f or some time past, to 
get us into every international situation and as much 
in the front as possible . Not realizing what the 
appalling possibilities are . [ 49 ] 
As in 1939 the belief was that in the event of war in Europe , 
Canadians would wish to participate . Until then Cabinet was most 
reluctant to act . One of the Ministers from Quebec said that "if 
war came, he assumed we would have to go into it; otherwise 
Communism . " His thoughts "seemed to be centring on Quebec being 
ready for a fight against Communism . " The Cabinet agreed that in 
the event of a war between Russia and the three great powers , 
"Canada would wish- to come in instantly." According to King , the 
Cabinet was "pretty chary about how far they were prepar ed t o go 
at thi s t i me ." [50] 
49 . King di ari es , 30 June 1948 . 
50. ibi d . 
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Domestic political conditions in March 1948 led King to believe 
that participation in an Atlantic pact would be generally wel l 
received within Canada. He had, however, been careful to make no 
firm commitments. Certainly, there were advantages to be gained 
from an arrangement that brought the United States and the United 
Kingdom together in trade and defence matters . The response to 
the Berlin crisis indicated that despite the public statements of 
policy issued by the Department of External Affairs, the Cabinet 
was not yet ready to become directly involved in a situation 
where the threat of war was real and immediate. 
Canadian policy in the spring of 1948 was influenced by various 
considerations. The internationalist sentiments prevalent within 
the Departments of Finance and External Affairs contributed to 
the interest displayed by certain Canadians in the creation of a 
more effective system of collective securi ty and in the 
elimination of barriers to international trade. King recognised 
the political value of keeping interest in security within the 
framework of the United Nations - public frustration with the 
performance of the Security Council could be transformed into 
support for a regional pact. In the event of an unfavourable 
reaction from some Canadians to a pact, the disappointment of 
others could be offset by continued Canadian presence in the 
General Assembly. In a similar way, the energies of the 
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proponents (both inside and outside Canada) of free trade were 
channeled into the security discussions - thus alleviating some 
of the political difficulties assoc i ated with advancing or 
halting the development of freer trade . The utility of an 
Atlantic pact in solving some of Canada's trade and defence 
relations problems was used as an argument to persuade both King 
and the Americans that a multilateral treaty was the only 
acceptable basis for a the defence of the north Atlantic area . 
Despite a belief that if war came , the country was ready to fight 
against a Communist threat in Europe , the Cabinet was not yet 
ready to volunteer Canadian support in a situation where there 
was an immediate risk of war . Old fears about overseas military 
commitments , and the associated domestic controversy , had not 
disappeared . There would have to be a further shift in attitude 
on the part of Cabinet (or a change in leadership) before Canada 
would join the North Atlantic Treaty . 
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Chapter 4 
1 July- 15 November 1948 
Canadian external policy entered a new phase late in the summer 
of 1948. In Ottawa during August the National Liberal Convention 
chose Louis St Laurent as the successor to King. The old Prime 
Minister was not immediately replaced, however. A Commonwealth 
Conference was due to take place in October and to avoid a 
negative reaction in French Canada it was agreed that St Laurent 
should not travel to London so soon after becoming Prime 
Minister. Mackenzie King remained as the official head of 
government until 15 November but his influence over policy was 
gradually reduced. One of the most important Cabinet decisions 
concerning the North Atlantic Treaty during was made while he was 
away in Europe. On 6 October Pearson, who had only recently 
become Minister responsible for External Affairs, sought and 
received Cabinet approval for Canada to proceed with negotiations 
leading to an Atlantic pact. Unlike King, St Laurent and Pearson 
both strongly favoured a pact and were not receptive to any 
dissenting opinion in Cabinet. 
Through the Vandenberg resolution the Senate had given tacit 
assent to American participation in further discussions leading 
to new security arrangements . Talks resumed in Washington 
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lasting from 5 to 9 July at which point a working group was left 
to prepare a draft proposal that emerged on 9 September . As an 
influential member of the "working committee" in Washington, 
Pearson, along with the British representative Sir Oliver Franks, 
worked towards developing the idea of an Atlantic pact to meet 
the needs of the North Americans and the Europeans.[1] It was on 
the basis of this 9 September paper that the participating 
nations decided whether or not to proceed with the development of 
an Atlantic pact. The Canadian Cabinet gave its approval at the 
beginning of October. In a secret message delivered on 29 October 
the State Department was informed that the Brussels Powers were 
ready to join further negotiations. France and the Benelux 
countries gave their assent only after considerable efforts by 
Bevin. They were concerned with the immediate provision of 
practical military assistance and were thinking in terms of 
accession by the United States to the Brussels Treaty. The 
Americans were still wedded to the concept of a united Europe and 
for a time they advocated a "two pillar" arrangement with the 
North Americans on one side and the Europeans on the other. The 
position of the United States remained unclear, however, until 
after the Nove~ber Presidential election. Truman's re-election 
cleared the way for talks leading to an Atlantic pact to resume 
in December . 
1 . Bullock , Bevin,p . 582. 
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Internationalist Ideals 
The reaction of Cabinet at the end of June to the Berlin crisis 
was a direct challenge to the internationalist aims of the 
Department of External Affairs. St Laurent, Pearson , and Reid 
continued to work towards an Atlantic pact primarily because of 
their belief that Canada should play her part in an effective 
system of collective security . A unilateral American guarantee 
of European defence or a "two-pillar" arrangement were both 
unacceptable from this perspective . Pearson's contribution to 
the Washington 
internationalist 
working group was certainly 
aims. The position of St Laurent 
shaped by 
as acting 
Prime Minister and Pearson as Minister for External Affairs 
ensured that these aims predominated over isolationist fears in 
the Cabinet decision recommending entry into the North Atlantic 
Treaty. 
In July there w~re signs that members of the State Department 
were being influenced by internationalist ideals and that they 
were interested in joining the sort of Atlantic grouping that 
Pearson and Reid favoured. The Vandenberg resolution was an 
indication that the Americans were considering the development of 
a treaty closely linked to the Uni ted Nations and that they might 
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proceed on the basis of Congressional discontent with the 
performance of the Security Council . Policy makers in the State 
Department were attracted by the idea of creating new 
federations , particularly in the European context. George Kennan 
was anxious that an Atlantic grouping should not close the door 
on a "real unification of Europe and the development of a 
European idea . "[2] British and Canadian insistance on an 
Atlantic grouping may have led some members of the State 
Department to be swayed by arguments for federation intended for 
European consumption . On 7 July 1948 Pearson reported : 
Mr. Lovett keeps refering to a "North Atlantic system" and t o the fact that arrangements agreed upon should be positive and not merely negative ; that co-operation should be wider than merely military co-operation and should be closely related to the principles and purposes of the United Nations . [3] 
The British were much less interested than the Canadians i n 
internationalist aims . Ernest Bevin was primarily seeking a firm 
American commitment to European defence while at the same time 
trying t o deflect attempts to unite Europe . 
The "two-pillar" or "dumb-bell" arrangement was an attempt by 
the Americans t o l_ceep the idea of a "United States of Europe " 
alive within the framework of an Atlantic pact . A dumb- bell 
arrangement had few attractions for Canada when she was hoping t o 
----------· 
2 . Bullock, Bevin , p. 600 and FRUS1948, 3 , p . 177 . 
3 . MG26 J4 v . 441 , Pearson t o Reid , WA- 1968 , 7 July 1948. 
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bring her defence and economic ties with Britain and the United 
States together in a partnership of equals. In July, in the 
British view, the Americans were still thinking in terms of a 
"third great power in the shape of a united Europe" and of an 
Atlantic Pact "more as a bridge between the United 
States/Canadian block and the European block than as an 
independent security system." The British negotiators were 
evidently pleased t o have help in their opposition to this 
American scheme: 
"The Canadians, and in particular Pearson , have been most helpful and constructive throughout. They have gone out of their way t o do what they could to direct the discussions to the consideration of a new Atlantic arrangement rather than an extension of the Brussels treaty , and they have made it plain that, so far as they were concerned, the latter had no attractions."[4] 
An extension of the Brussels treaty was much more difficult to 
present to the Canadian public; it being viewed as a simple 
military alliance. It would be easier to join a pact designed 
from the start as a means of defending the whole of the north 
Atlantic area. The Canadian internationalists hoped for much 
more than a simple military alliance. 
In September, the Americans were seeking to restrict 
participation in the Pact "to those western European countries 
which accepted the obligations of the Brussels Treaty". The 
reasons were not put forward at the meetings but were explained 
4. PRO, F0800/453/def/48/40 ,13 July 1948. 
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privately to Wrong who reported that the State Department 
" ••• consider that it would increase the influence of 
the United States in promoting a closer relationship 
among the western European countries leading to the 
establishment of a European federation" . [5] 
Under Bevin's leadership, Britain stood firmly against pressure 
for European unification, and they were wary of attempts to use a 
North Atlantic Pact to secure similar aims. 
Escott Reid was able to draw upon State department interest in 
European federation in pursuit of his own internationalist aims. 
He hoped that the failed institutions of the UN could be replaced 
through North Atlantic treaty. The Soviet Union, Reid believed, 
would continue to render the United Nations ineffective the 
North Atlantic Community 
"will probably, over the next five years, develop 
organs and agencies and secretaries which will do for its members most of the things which it had intended 
the U.N. should do."[6] 
Some of thes~ organs would, in time, be created, but Reid's 
proposal to launch them immediately did not find much support 
even among Canadian policy makers. Hume Wrong did not share 
Reid's internationalist ideals and, after Pearson left 
Washington, Reid had great difficulty convincing Wrong to work 
for more than a military alliance . The British were dubious of 
5 . MG31 E46 v.6, Wrong to DEA , 4 Sept . 1948. 
6. MG3 1 E46 v.6 , memo. for Riddell , 27 Aug.1948 . 
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the value of bodies that might develop supra-national 
characteristics and which were not of immediate and practical 
value . Reid would have found a more sympathetic audience with 
policy makers in France, who were considering preparing public 
opinion for a break from the idea of national sovereignty through 
the creation of a European Assembly . Bevin, however, thought that 
it "was a dangerous thing to launch big ideas and then to 
di sappoint people."[7] 
Through his work in preparing a commentary on the 9 September 
Washington paper, Reid hoped to shape the form of the security 
arrangements: firstly by having his aims accepted as the basis of 
Canadian policy and secondly, by altering the course of the next 
round of negotiations through having his commentary accepted by 
other nations as the basis of discussion. Even among the 
Canadian internationalists there was little desire to adopt a 
policy that could not find support with other nations. Reid had 
to then argue that the Americans or British would in fact find 
his proposals useful: 
"Is there not a possibility that the United Kingdom 
might find it useful to have • • • an [Atlantic] Assembly 
established? I:t might for example , lessen the press ure 
on the United Kingdom to concur in the establishment of 
a Western European Parliamentary Assembly . "[8] 
The British were unlikely to agree to create in an Atlantic 
7 . Bullock , Bevin , p . 615 . 
8 . MG31 E46 v . 6 , Reid t o Robertson , 11 Nov . 1948 . 
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setting that which they opposed in Europe . Referri ng back to past 
statements of policy , Reid attempted to argue that the "official 
attitude of the Canadian government is that the road we are on 
is , we hope, leading to the establishment of a world organization 
of the remaining free states . " This may have been true in 1947 
or early in 1948 when the creation of an organisation parallel to 
the UN was under more serious consideration. King certainly 
never agreed t o such a policy and St Laurent was not about to 
take the lead in such a development . 
The internationalist aims of St Laurent, Pearson , and Reid 
underlay the Canadian insistance that security arrangements take 
the form of a multilateral treaty based on the north Atlantic 
region . King probably would have been satisfied with any 
arrangement in which the United States made a firm commitment and 
in which Canada was not left alone in either a Commonwealth or 
North American grouping . A north Atlantic pact was useful in 
reconc i ling Canada ' s defence and economic ties with Britain and 
the United States but this , in itself, was not sufficiently 
important t o overcome resistance to overseas military 
commitments . Cabinet_' s approval of Canadian participation i n the 
North Atlantic Treaty was directly tied t o the fact that St 
Laurent was the acting Pr ime Minister and was an internati onalist 
himself . 
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Defence Considerations 
The Berlin crisis raised serious questions for the Canadian 
proponents of the North Atlantic Treaty. How could Cabinet and 
the public be convinced to support the Treaty while the 
government was refusing to contribute to the Berlin airlift? 
More importantly, how could the Department of External Affairs 
square its own "crusade" for the Treaty with the attempts by 
other Cabinet Ministers to defend Canada's refusal to send air 
transport to Berlin? 
The Canadian government had great difficulty defending its 
attitude towards the Berlin crisis after a press report in 
Britain claimed that the Dominions had been asked to contribute 
to the airlift. Canada's High Commissioner in London was 
immediately informed that it would be "a great embarrassment to 
us if any requests were made for transport planes . "[9] The 
Canadian press were told, off the record by Brooke Claxton the 
Minister of Defence , that there were two reasons why no 
contribution was forthcoming - Canada had no part in the German 
occupation and "no desire to take part in a situation that might 
g. 30 June 1948 , quoted in Stacey,Canada and the age of conflict,2 , p . 415. 
10 . quoted in Holmes , The shaping of peace , 2 , p . 10~ 
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easily explode into war."[10] These same arguments could easily 
be turned against the North Atlantic Treaty . Pearson and Reid 
were understandably concerned about . this.[11] The Canadian 
position became even more difficult to maintain after the offers 
of assistance from Australia and South Africa:"The fact that a 
South African Government which is considered to be so unfriendly 
to the British connection has made this gesture naturally points 
up the problem so far as Canada is concerned."[12] 
By September, Claxton had reversed his position- he was now 
prepared to recommend that Royal Canadian Air Force should make a 
contribution. Even in King's absence, however, the Cabinet 
declined to make a offer of support. The best public excuse the 
government could produce was that Canada could make a more 
effective contribution to relieving the siege of Berlin through 
her position as a an unbiased member of the Security Council. If 
King had remained as Prime Minister through into 1949 perhaps a 
similar argument would have been used in the event that 
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty was declined. 
The problem of the Berlin airlift was complicated by 
reluctance to allow Canada to contribute as part 
Cabinet's 
of a 
Commonwealth force. The 30 June report in the London Evening 
Standard that had caused so much controversy was headlined 
11 . Eayrs,In defence of Canada,4,p.45-6. 
12. Pearson to Ottawa,ibid,p.48. 
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"EMPIRE ASKED TO BREAK BERLIN SIEGE". Pearson reported that this 
had caused ''great irritation" in Ottawa . [ 13 ] King had once again 
recalled the Chanak incident of 1922 in which Churchill's 
ill-considered request of assistance 
over Commonwealth ties in the 
was 
summer 
refused.[14] 
of 1948 
The storm 
undoubtedly 
contributed to St Laurent's decision that he should not travel to 
October meeting of the Prime Ministers in London: "it would be 
the worst thing that could happen to him so far as Quebec is 
concerned ••• "[15 ] In French Canada it might be said that 
relations with Britain were taking precedence over domestic 
concerns. King was thus to remain in office until after he had 
travelled to London and to Paris for the third General Assembly 
of the UN . 
The problems associated with resisting demands for increased 
defence co-operation within the Commonwealth remained real, 
providing further incentive for entering a pact that included 
both the United States and United Kingdom. One of the most 
outspoken critics of the Liberal government's direction of the 
Canadian war effort was George Drew. He became leader of the 
Conservatives at the beginning of October 1948. King immediately 
began to worry ·that Drew 
13. ibid 
14. Stacey, Canada and the age of conflict,2,p.17. 
15. Picker sgill and Forster , Mackenzie King Record , vol .4,369. 
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"will centre above all else on a centralized 
Empire •••• There will be raised the old prejudices of 
race [i.e.language] and religion. If the international 
situation develops along more dangerous lines, it will 
be hard to say if something approaching civil strife 
may not develop in Canada." [ 16 ] 
A debate in the House of Commons in London caused concern in 
Ottawa. Both Anthony Eden and Ernest Bevin were apparently 
"endorsing the idea of a third force which would 
balance the forces of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, and both, therefore - if the report of the 
debate is accurate - seem to be thinking in terms other 
than the sort of association between the the United 
Kingdom and the United States which we desire to see 
brought about.[1 7] 
On both sides of the Atlantic, old notions about organising the 
Commonwealth as a unit were slow to die and neither King nor St 
Laurent was about to encourage their revival. 
King was "most anxious to avoid the talks with the other Prime 
Ministers [ in London] being made a substitute for an Imperial 
Conference to frame policies for the Commonwealth."[18] It was 
not without cause that the Canadians were apprehensive. A brief 
prepared by the British Minister of Defence, A.V . Alexander, 
proposed that: 
"The Commonwealth taken as a unit, if, and only if, 
properly organised to act QUickly together is perhaps 
better placed defensively because of geographical 
16 . Pickersgill and Forster,Mackenzie King Record ,4, p . 393, 3 
Oct .1 948 . 
17. MG26 J4 v.441, Wrong to Reid,20 Sept.1948. 
18. ibid, King to St Laurent 23 Sept.1948. 
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dispersal- than either Russia or America." 
He hoped "to put formal proposals to this end" before the Prime 
Ministers' conference in October.[19] It is interesting that 
Alexander described the United Kingdom as the "connecting pin 
between European and American co-operation" when many Canadians 
considered this to be their role. In London, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, at least, was aware of the sensitivity of the 
issue: 
" The theme of "intensive Commonwealth 
be handled with care in light of 
susceptibilities of Mr. Mackenzie King 
the new South African Government].[20] 
planning" must 
the strong 
[and probably 
Bevin, whose opposi~on to European federation was based on a 
desire to maintain an independent British policy, was receptive 
to the argument presented during King's visit to London that 
"each nation had a right to have its own foreign policies as well 
as policies on domestic affairs ••• ". Bevin's reply was that "the 
military were hard to convince". [21] 
To the British Foreign secretary, King described how he had 
"succeeded in getting Canada into the war quietly" and he "found 
19. PRO F0800/453 6 July 1948,brief prepared by Alexander for 
talks with Chifley. 
20. PRO F0800/453/def/48/33· 
21 . Pickersgill and Forster , The Mackenzie King record,4,p.396 . 
22. Pickersgill and Forster, Mackenzie King Record, 4, p-396,5 
Oct . 1948 . 
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Bevin most receptive to that point of view."[22] As in the two 
world wars, an effective Canadian contribution was dependent on 
the avoidance of domestic controversy. During the 1930's King 
had refused to commit Canada to any Imperial defence schemes 
because he believed that such controversy would only weaken the 
Empire. If war involving Britain broke out in Europe opinion in 
Canada would be such that the desires of the minority would be 
ignored in favour of participation. This had been true in 1914 
and 1939 and there was little doubt in King's mind that the same 
held true in 1948. If King had remained as Prime Minister for 
another year these same arguments might have been used against 
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Economic Considerations 
Economic considerations were of much less significance in 
Canadia~ policy towards the North Atlantic Treaty after King's 
opposition to free trade had been made clear. Provisions for 
economic co~operation had already been introduced into the 
negotiations. Pearson, a proponent of free trade, was in a 
position as the leading Canadian at the summer negotiations to 
ensure that the door remained open for developing trade matters 
after King's retirement. Pearson's internationalist ideals 
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coincided with his belief in freer trade. The strength of a 
federation could be increased through the removal of barriers t o 
multilateral trading. The British , however, were busy resisting 
pressure for closer economic integration with Europe and were not 
about to support proposals that entailed the breakdown of the 
sterling area. Calls for the integration of the north Atlantic 
economies were not calculated to relieve British anxiety arising 
from the American failure to understand the seriousness of the 
United Kingdom's economic difficulties: the demand for economic 
concessions on a quid quo pro basis; the indifference, often 
hostility, to the Sterling area; insistence on the elimination of 
economic discrimination by a given date without regard to 
circumstances; America's own failure to reduce tariffs or control 
inflation.[23] In reply to Bri tish criticism of the draft 
Article 2, Wrong pointed out that the Canadian proposals were 
not intended solely or even mainly to 
multilateral action under the agreement, 
purpose was to give a general blessing 
colaboration between any or all of the 
economic, social and cultural matters.[24] 
bring about 
but that its 
to intimate 
parties in 
From Wrong's reasoning, it appears that easing the political 
difficulties associated with an American trade deal remained a 
prominent concern. Pearson's interest in trade and in the 
internationalist ideals led him to lend his name to a memorandum 
23. Bullock, Bevin,603. 
24. MG 31 E46 v.6 Wrong memo. 4 Sept., 1948. 
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to Cabinet drafted by Reid which proposed that if a movement 
towards the North -A tlantic Community's " political and economic 
unification can be started this .year, no one can forecast the 
extent of the unity which may exist five , ten or fifteen years 
from now." [ 25 ] Although economic considerations were of 
decreased importance , they continued to underlie the push by 
Canada for the inclusion 
provisions. 
in the treaty of non-military 
Domestic Political Considerations 
Participation in the North Atlantic treaty entailed a formal 
commitment to the defence of Europe . Domestic politics was the 
paramount concern since public acceptance of such an 
unprecedented act was most uncertain. Military commitments had , 
in the past, been made by Canada only after the outbreak of war. 
In those circumstances the strong opposition of a minority was 
overwhelmed, but in the absence of a clear threat of war the 
opponents of military entanglements held a potentially decisive 
position . The Liberals had only a slim majority in the House and 
were dependent upon back bench support from Quebec. In this 
25 . MG31 E46 v . 6 , Memo to Cabinet , 4 Oct . 1948 . 
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situation it is not at all clear that Canada would have agreed to 
join the North Atlantic treaty, if Louis St Laurent had not been 
chosen as King's successor in August 1948. 
The attitude of the Canadian Cabinet to overseas commitments 
had changed rather dramatically when the Berlin crisis reveal ed 
that there was a clear threat of war in Europe. In July King 
noted that the "significant thing today has been the apprecia tion 
at last by the Cabinet and also by External Affairs that there is 
a very real possibility of war, and that within the very near 
future. St Laurent and others have repeatedly said that 
there would be no war, which I told them was a great mistake. 
Claxton, too, as War Minister has talked in this way. What utter 
foolishness. "[26] 
At the Cabinet meeting where the decision was made to inform 
other governments that Canada was ready to enter a "defensive 
alliance of the North Atlantic states"[27] St Laurent was 
present as acting Prime Minister and Pearson as Minister for 
External Affairs. Pearson recalled that 
26. King diaries,20 July 1948. 
27. MG31 E46 v.6 memo. to Cabinet, 4 October 1948 . 
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"My memorandum was given a close examination and vigorous 
discussion took place since it represented a highly important 
change in Canadian foreign policy." [ 28] Just how "vigorous" the 
discussion was remains uncertain. [ 29 ] Cabinet may have been 
fortified by the press response to recent speeches on the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and by the knowledge that the chief political 
parties had indicated their support for the Treaty. [ 30] One thing 
is certain: St Laurent and Pearson were much less sympathetic to 
dissenting opinion in Cabinet than King. 
When the old Prime Minister met Pearson at the end of the 
month, King indicated that he did not agree with the way that 
public support was being sought for the Treaty. Claxton had given 
a speech a few days before in which he stated that "the Soviet 
attitude since the end of the war has driven the Western 
democracies into the same kind of union to preserve the peace as 
was needed to win the war . " [ 31 ] King considered this speech to 
be ill-advised and that "Claxton was really helping to focus 
Russia's emnity on Canada." The Prime Minister did not like 
28. Munro and I nglis, Mike,2,p.54 . 
29. Eayrs,In defence of Canada,4 , p . 97. 
30. Soward,Canadian external policy ,p. 91-2. 
31. MG32 B5 v.109,"Statements made by the Canadian government on the proposed north atlantic treaty",29 Oct.1948 . 
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"Canada attempting to assume a position and take on 
responsiblities greater than those which belong t o the u . s . and 
the U. K., not to speak of other nations . "[ 32 ] 
Under normal circumstances , the CCF would have led opposition 
to what was described as the "North Atlantic War Pact", but that 
party had just expelled the communists from within its own ranks 
and it was not about to follow the directive from Moscow to 
openly oppose the Pact . Reluctance to support a treaty would have 
remained with many of the peopl e who ordinarily supported the 
CCF . Five years after the t reaty was signed , Reid recalled that 
a treaty that was merely a military alliance would have been a l most impossible to sell to the c.c.F . or to the non-conformist conscience of the United Church . To get wholehearted support both in the house of Commons and in the country the North Atlantic Treaty had to have a "positive and moral content" • • •• [33 ] 
Support from the French Canadian wing of the liberal Party was 
equally uncertain . Andre Laurendeau, who was by no means an 
extremist and whose influence extended to non- nationalist groups 
in Quebec had written an editorial in Le Devoir recommending 
neutrality f or Canada . Reid received a memorandum from M. Cadieux 
who pointed out that "nationalist leaders in Quebec are now 
building up a thesis i n favour of our neutrality i n case of a war 
between the u. s. s . R. and the u . s . A.". He went on to suggest that 
32 . Picker sgill and Forster , The Mackenzie king record , 4 , p . 426 . 30 Oct . 1948 . 
33. MG31 E46 v . 13 , interview with Reid , 1954 . 
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"those who are responsible for the formulation of our foreign 
policy should bear in mind the possibility of serious opposition" 
to a security pact . Reid agreed with M. Cadieux's recommendation 
that it "would be wise if some members of the Cabinet might make 
a public reply to the kind of argument in the editorial". 
Difficulties in Quebec were apparent to foreign observers as 
well. One month later, Brooke Claxton was asked by the 
Australian High Commissioner if the hostile attitude of the 
French Canadian press threatened serious political difficulty. 
In reply, the Canadian Minister of Defence noted that the fact 
that the aggressor was Communist helped to overcome the 
traditional French Canadian attitude . [34 ] Distrust in Quebec of 
military commitments was not easily quelled and continued : warnings 
"La propogande de certains journeaux canadiens ••• critique l'alliance nord-atlantique sous le pretexte que nous nous engageons par cette alliance a entre en guerre, m~me si notre pays n'est pas menace. " [ 35] 
Before Canada joined the security discussions in March 
Mackenzie King was most reluctant to adopt anti-communist 
rhetoric and he was particularly concerned about statements that 
refe~d directly to the Soviet Union as a threat . No similar 
reluctance had been shown at External Affairs however : 
34. MG32 B5 v . 109 , 15 Nov . 1948, Claxton t o Pearson , "Australia and the North Atlantic Security Pact" . 
35 . MG26 1 v.47, letter t o St Laurent from Ladger Dionne , MP . 
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"I get increasingly alarmed at the lack of judgement 
on the part of External Affairs in these matters and am beginning to mistrust St . Laurent's judgement in them. 
I think he has been carried away with clerical feelings 
against the Communists which has accused him to lose judgement •••• "[36] 
As part of an effort to gain the support of the Liberal party for 
the Atlantic pact, King was willing speak of the danger posed by 
communism. He announced at the National Liberal Convention that 
"Communism is the greatest menace of our times, because Communism 
more than all else, is destructive of Freedom the freedom of 
individuals and the freedom of nations".[37] 
French Canadian isolationism would be overcome largely on the 
basis of their antipathy to Communism. The depiction of the 
treaty as more than a military alliance was also important, but 
was of greater significance among English-speaking Canadians. 
That Canada was proposing to join Britain in a treaty was enough 
to ensure the support of the Commonwealth-minded. Most 
importantly, public acceptance of the treaty depended upon the 
European situation being perceived as threatening and Cold V ar 
rhetoric became common currency in public pronouncements. 
The Canadian Cabinet's reluctance to make overseas military 
36. King Diaries, March 1948 . 
37. MG32 B5, "Press releases and speeches", 6 Aug. , 1948. 
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commitments was revealed in their reaction t o the Berlin crisis . 
The internationalist aims of St Laurent, Pearson , and Reid were 
not immediately challenged . Canada was currently engaged in 
negotiations in Washington , in which Pearson was pressing the 
United States t o join a multilateral treaty around the North 
Atlantic. By the time of the next important Cabinet decision 
regarding the North Atlantic treaty St Laurent had been chosen as 
King's successor and was the acting-Prime Minister . Pearson had 
made the somewhat startling move from Under-Secretary to Minister 
for External Affairs . Reid became the acting Under-Secretary. 
Cabinet was in no position t o resist the internationalist aims of 
these men at the beginning of October. Canada was the first 
country t o declare a readiness to join further discussions 
leading to the North Atlantic Treaty . Truman ' s election victory 
in November 1948 enabled the next round of talks t o resume almost 
immediately . 
J 
l 
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Chapter 5 
15 November 1948 to 4 April 1949 
Louis St Laurent's succession to Mackenzie King as Prime 
Minister marked the beginning an internationalist phase in 
Canadian policy which lasted through the 1950s. Escott Reid 
sought to take advantage of the change in leadership by pushing 
for the adoption of even more ambitious internationalist aims. 
These aims could only be realised if Canada took the lead and 
pressed its demands at the "exploratory talks" in Washington, due 
to resume 10 December 1948. Before any new policy was adopted, 
the relative importance of various considerations once again had 
to be examined. Even in King's absence, domestic politics 
remained a major consideration except that his passive approach 
was abandonp ed in favour of an active effort to gain political 
support for a potentially controversial policy - participation in 
the North Atlantic Treaty. St Laurent would soon be leading his 
party in a general election and the Treaty had to be, as much as 
possible, a political asset. 
Agreement with other nations on the form of the security 
arrangement was expected within a few months . The Canadian 
negotiating team led by Hume Wrong was instructed to push f or the 
inclusion of the non-military provisions which eventually became 
Article 2 of the Treaty . When this decision was made substantial 
opposition from other nations was not expected, but by the end of 
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January, the United States wished to see Article 2 eliminated. 
By that time, however, the "general welfare" provisions were 
considered sufficiently important by Canada to warrant 
threatening withdrawal from the negotiations unless the draft 
Article 2 remained in a reasonable form. The Canadian people had 
been led to expect more than a " mere military alliance" by the 
public pronouncements issued during. the preceding months. The 
influence of internationalist ideals was significant in those 
pronouncements, particularly while security arrangements more 
closely tied to the United Nations were under discussion and 
while a free trade agreement was still a possibility. In the 
face of American opposition to Article 2, and in the absence of 
Mackenzie King, improved trade was once again brought forth as an 
argument for including a provision for economic co-operation. As 
it turned out, the Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949 
included what Canada considered the minimum requirements for 
non-military provisions. The Canadian attitude towards Article 
2, as her attitude towards other finer points in the Treaty was 
determined to the greatest degree by the need to mobilise 
domestic political support for the most essential 
internationalist aim- the creation of a regional security pact. 
Internationalist Ideals 
- 109 -
King's resignation from his position as Prime Minister provided 
Reid with a fresh environment in which to pursue his 
i nternationalist aims . St Laurent had been much more sympathetic 
than King to the ideals of the United Nations , but any visions 
that Reid may have had of immediately securing the support of the 
old political head of External Affairs must have vanished upon 
receipt of a memorandum from A. D. P. Heeney who was currently 
Secretary to Cabinet but by March 1949 had become Under-Secretary 
for External Affairs . Reid sought to gain, within a very few 
days, Cabinet approval for a plan that entailed taking the lead 
at the Washington talks in order to push for a conception of the 
Treaty more in line with his own internationalist ideals. Heeney 
advised against rushing ahead : "With regard to the proposed 
Treaty as a whole, I think that before we become too deeply 
committed we should pause and take pretty thorough stock of our 
own po s~ion at home." [ 1] St Laurent was not convinced by Reid ' s 
argument that " if you have a draft treaty prepared in advance 
and can get it accepted as the basis of discussion, you are in a 
strong position."[2 ] The problem was that this position could 
not be achieved without rushing the task of gaining the support 
of Cabinet . 
1 . MG26 14 v.224, Heeney to Reid,17 November 1948 . 
2 . MG 31 E46 v . 6 , Memo. f or the PM from Rei d, 15 Nov . 1948 . 
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From the Office of the Prime Minister came the message that : " I 
think the timetable suggested • .• is in t oo high a gear . " [3] 
Reid hoped to rally the spiritual forces of the western 
democracies through the creation of imaginative new institutions; 
thus the popular perceptions of state relations that saw the 
merging of sovereignties as leading to greater security could be 
drawn upon to positive effect in the defence against Communism. 
I n the preceding months Reid had not been restrained in his 
pursuit of internationalist aims by either St Laurent or Pearson 
that task could be l eft to King. Hume Wrong, who was to head 
the Canadian team at the next round of talks in Washington, had 
little use for Reid's ambitious schemes: 
The purpose of the negotiation is to tie up the 
western 
merge the 
Union, and 
United States with the defence of 
Europe, • ••• Your aim seems to be wholly to Western Union movement in a North Atlantic 
this will not go down here. [ 4] 
St Laurent was concerned, much more tha~ was Reid, with the task 
of gaining re-election which had to weighed against 
internationalist ideals . The only senior policy maker to support 
Reid was Pearson. Without the support of the newly appointed 
Minister for External Affairs, it is likely that Canada would 
have taken an even more passive role i n the remaining 
3. MG26 1 v . 224 , hand written memo. from PMO 16 of 17 November 1948. 
4 . quoted in Eayrs,In defence of Canada , 4,p . 102 . 
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negotiations and accepted a treaty without strong non-military 
provisions. 
St Laurent's own statements were pointed to as proof that Reid 
and the new Prime Minister were in essential agreement: 
The draft emphasises at various pointJ your thesis 
that the proposed North Atlantic Alliance must be an 
outward and visible sign that the North Atlantic Nations are bound together not merely by their common 
opposition to Communist Totalitarianism but by a common belief in the virtues of our western civilization ••• [5 ] 
St Laurent's concern was mobilising political support for the 
Treaty and he was not about to be constrained by past statements 
on external policy. 
Reid's proposals were subject to criticism even from Pearson. 
Despite his doubts, the Minister for External Affairs remained 
the most important supporter of Reid's internationalist aims. 
Pearson was generally supportive of Reid's approach over Wrong's 
(the leader of the Canadian team in the final phase of the 
negotiations who sought little more than a military alliance). 
[6] Reid was eventually successful in gaining Cabinet approval 
for his comme~tary setting out Canada's position in the 
forthcoming negotiations. His influence was reflected throughout 
the commentary, but his most significant achievements were those 
5. MG31 E46 v.6, memo . for the PM from Reid 15 November 1948. 
6. G.A.H.Pearson, "Canada and the beginnings of NATO", p.25 . 
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points that challenged Wrong's view that "We are making an 
alliance here and not a federation''. [7] Cabinet agreed that "In 
order to emphasize to positive and moral content of the treaty, 
it should include provisions for consultation, co-operation and 
common action in the economic field ••• ".As well, "the preamble 
should set forth the belief of the signatories in the values 
and virtues of their common civilization •••• "[s] 
Under St Laurent 's direction, securing the support of Cabinet 
took precedence over the more ambitious internationalist aims 
advocated by Reid. Other nations were left to lead the 
development of the treaty . Canada did exert itself in ensuring 
that the Treaty contained non-military provisions - Pearson's own 
internationalist ideals and the realization that the public did 
expect more than a mere military alliance had tipped the balance 
in favour of Reid . 
Defence Considerations 
Defence considerations also predominated over some of Reid's 
internationalist aims and shaped the Canadian attitude towards 
7. G.A.H. Pearson," Canada and the beginnings of NATO ", ·p.24. 
8. MG31 E46 v.6,memo. to Cabinet,1 Dec.1948. 
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the wording of the pledge and membership in the Treaty . Hume 
Wrong and A.D.P. Heeney thought that Canada should not be 
distracted by non-military aspects of the Treaty : 
If we press f or more than a North Atlantic Alliance 
the negotiations may be long and protracted, the other 
countries may not want to go as far as we and we may 
prejudice the attainment of what is really necessary. 
Therefore , I think we should stick to the last of a 
military alliance only. [9] 
That Reid's proposals were not defeated by this argument was due 
largely to the fact that there were also domestic political 
considerations involved - a purely military arrangement was bound 
to encounter substantial opposition. 
Canadian opposition to attempts by the United States to water 
down the Treaty's pledge of mutual assistance was based primarily 
upon the consideration that a strong pledge was necessary to 
deter Soviet aggression. A memorandum to Cabinet argued that the 
purposes of the Treaty could not be "realised unless both the 
Soviet Union and the Western European nations are convinced that 
any attack .•• would immediately bring the overwhelming economic 
and military power of the United States and the other signatories 
into the struggle".[10] Defence had possibly become a more 
significant consideration since King's departure since he 
certainly would not have supported an arrangement that appeared 
9. MG26 l v.224,Reid to Pearson,25 Nov.1948. 
10. DEA prints and rejects,R14,16 Feb.1949· 
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to commit the country automatically. The inclusion of Portugal 
in the Treaty was accepted for her strategic importance against 
the hope that the North Atlantic Alliance would be a grouping 
based on high democratic ideals. Domestic politics might still 
be viewed as the dominant underlying concern if a strong pledge 
and strategically sound alliance was sought in order to reduce 
the likelihood of war and the associated domestic upheaval. 
Economic Considerations 
Arguments based on economic considerations were used by some 
Canadian policy makers to advocate the inclusion of provisions in 
the Treaty for economic co-operation. Other Canadians used 
similarly based arguments to oppose such provisions . Opponents 
po i nted out that Canada might be asked to devote a greater 
proportion of her wealth to the common cause than she was 
prepared to accept . Proponents once again pointed to the 
possibility of using the Treaty to resolve some of the country ' s 
trade relations problems King's resignation reopened the 
possibility of a new trade agreement with the United States . 
Economic arguments were turned against Reid ' s proposals for 
including non-military provisions in the treaty by Heeney : 
It may turn out that we will be substantial 
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contributors to the North Atlantic pool because of our 
position and resources, but we should not take too 
leading a part in negotiations until we have more 
definite indications of what our treaty obligations are 
to be in men, money and materials. There is, in my 
view, the real danger that we may be open to the charge 
of speaking loudly and carrying a pretty small 
twig.[11 ] 
Heeney's comment on Reid's proposals for agencies designed to 
increase economic co-operation was "We are co-operating pretty 
well anyway."[12 ] St Laurent was "doubtful of general 
propositions of which the development is hard to foresee". [ 13] 
Despite these doubts and criticisms, Reid's aims prevailed-
the non-military provisions were essential if the Treaty were to 
find the necessary political support in Canada. Problems arose 
after Dean Acheson became Secretary of State in January 1949. 
There had recently been problems in Congress with the "general 
welfare" provisions in the Rio Treaty. Acheson did not want a 
repetition of similar problems and neither did Tom Connolly or 
Arthur Vandenberg, the leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. The strong opposition of the latter two was made clear 
to Acheson in meetings on 3 and 5 February. [ 14] The pursuit trade 
matters through the treaty was once again brought forward as an 
11. quoted in Reid, Time of fear and hope,p . 246.DEA File 
283s,pt4, 20 Nov . 1948. 
12 . MG26 1 v . 224 25 Nov . 1948 . 
13 . MG32 B5 v.112,1 Dec.1948. 
14. Eayrs,In defence of Canada,4 , p.119. 
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argument for Canada insisting on the retention of the 
non-military provisions - this time by Pearson. He was still 
thinking of a free trade deal with the United States and advised 
St Laurent, in preparation for a meeting between the Canadian 
Prime Minister and President Truman , that "it would be very 
useful if you could get his [the President's] reaction t~ the 
general proposition of removing all possible barriers to 
trade".[15] If he were still in a position to influence policy, 
King would undoubtedly have been enraged by Pearson 's 
proposition. One of the main purposes of the meeting with Truman 
was to put forth the Canadian arguments for the non-military 
provisions that were contained in the draft Article 2. 
The Canadians believed that the discussions with the President 
had been most satisfactory: "The President cordially agreed with 
the remark by the Prime Minister that it would be in the 
interests of the two countries that trade should be as free from 
restriction as possible."[16] As part of the effort to reverse 
the American attitude towards Article 2, a memorandum was left 
with the State Department setting out the Canadian economic and 
domestic political considerations. It also noted the assurances 
of support that Canada had secured from the British, French and 
Dutch ~hese had been gathered in haste after American 
15 . DEA prints and rejects,Pearson to Wrong, 9 Feb . 1949 . 
16 . MG26 1 v.235,12 Feb . 1949 , Canadian record of the conversation between PM and President . 
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opposition became apparent.) 
The Americans were not easily persuaded and from Acheson's 
account on the discussions with the President , Pearson concluded 
that "I think that we will find that Mr. Truman's amiable offers 
of assistance and co- operation may be somewhat difficult to 
implement". Agreement on the inclusion of Article 2 was 
eventually reached, although in a form weaker than had been 
hoped. The other nations were persuaded by arguments based on 
Canadian economic and, much more importantly, domestic political 
considerations. 
Domestic Political Considerations 
Ensuring that the Treaty would be a political asset had become 
the dominant concern in the last months of negotiations . Re id 
sought to create a treaty that had wide popular appeal, but his 
plan entailed rushing the task of gaining Cabinet approval for a 
course of action that would place Canada in the forefront of a 
most important international endeavour . Hume Wrong, Norman 
Robertson, and A. D.P. Heeney all favoured a much more 
conservative approach , avoiding difficulties as long as the 
primary aim of creating a military alliance was achieved . Under 
the direction of St Laurent and Pearson , neither extreme was 
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adopted . A purely military arrangement was politically 
unacceptable. Leading a development that would multiply Canada's 
external commitments was equally unattractive . In general, 
Canadian policy makers were going to be satisfied with a 
multilateral treaty that included and a strong pledge of mutual 
assistance. Domestic political considerations led Canada to 
challenge the opposition of other nations on the issues of the 
Treaty's membership, its scope, its duration and most importantly 
its non-military provisions. 
In a January discussion among St Laurent, Pearson, and Wrong 
three points had struck the Prime Minister as being important for 
the public acceptance of the Treaty in Canada. First, the areas 
specifically covered "should not include any colonial territory"; 
second, the duration of the Treaty should be only twelve years -
while it was directed towards the Soviet Union, "it would be 
politically easy to defend Canadian participation" but the world 
could change; third, a reference to constitutional process "would 
be of some value in defending the Treaty in Canada". Its 
introduction, however, could be left to the United States.[17] 
With regard to th~ first point, Pearson had noted that 
The Prime Minister's main concern was about possible political difficulties in Canada if French North Africa 
were included in the Treaty, and in particular fi'encb.. lto!'-'l;fi AfFiea . A11t.-r1~ 
17. MG31 E46 v.6, 8 Jan . 1949. 
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He thought that this would 
difficult issues should an 
develop strongly among the 
Algeria , or Tunis . [ 18] 
give rise later on to 
independence movement 
inhabitants on Morocco , 
The inclusion of Italy may have been considered a problem for two 
reasons: it was difficult to conceive of Italy as a north 
Atlantic nation and she had only recently been an enemy 
belligerent and a theatre of war for Canadian soldiers . [19 ] 
Offering membership to Portugal was opposed on the grounds that 
her regime was incompatible with the ideals expressed in the 
Treaty and thus a obstacle to domestic political support . In the 
end , Canada retreated from her stance on membership and scope . 
The French insisted that their north African Departments be 
included . St Laurent noted that "Algeria was not a matter of 
great importance to the main purposes of the Treaty , but France 
was essential . " [ 20 ] At the insistance of others , Canada conceded 
!.. 
that Portugal shouldAincluded for strategic reasons. As for the 
duration of the Treaty , a provision allowing f or a review at the 
end of ten years" had been introduced as a result of 
representations of the Canadian government . "[21] 
The domestic political arguments for playing a leading role in 
the negotiations and pushing for the inclusion of non- military 
18 . MG31 E46 v . 6 . 
19. Eayrs , In Defence of Canada,4, p . 115 . 
20 . Munro and Inglis,Mike , 2 , p . 55 . 
21 . DEA Prints and rejects, 10 March 1949 . 
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provisions had been clearly laid out by Escott Reid in November 
while the Canadian attitude was being reassessed. Heeney had 
turned some of these arguments against Reid: 
I feel we should not take too leading a part in 
negotiations unless we have thought out in advance 
what our obligations might be, and what the 
reaction of Canadians are going to be after hearing 
their government plump for the treaty and then discover 
that we might be unable to fulfill our obligations. [22] 
In response to Reid's arguments, St Laurent doubted "very much 
whether the Canadian people have much of a conception of the 
implications of this treaty".[23] Reid proposed that Canada 
could point to her own domestic political considerations in the 
negotiations with other nations and in so doing, increase her 
bargaining power: 
My suggestion is that the present domestic political 
situation in Canada and the United States [with isolationism in retreat] perhaps make it possible for 
us to exert a greater influence on the forthcoming 
Washington discussions than we could normally 
expect.[24] 
St Laurent's rather harsh comment was: "prove it".[25 ] Reid ' s 
claim that St Laurent's own public statements demonstrated that 
Canada had already committed herself to create much more than a 
military alliance, was refuted by Heeney : 
22. MG26 1 v.224,c17 Nov. 1948 . 
23. ibid, Heeney to Reid,c17 Nov.1948. 
24. MG31 E46 v.6, memo . for the PM from Reid , 15 Nov. 1948. 
25. ibid,memo. for Pickersgill,PMO,c17 Nov.1948. 
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[26] 
Statements made by the Prime Minister and other 
members of the Cabinet give a fairly clear indication 
of what the government desires. In a sense they are 
statements of policy . They a~e too a means of 
educating the Canadian people. Final policy of course 
depends upon a decision of the whole Cabinet . 
Despite the criticisms leve ed at Reid , his belief that 
Canadians expected more than a mere military alliance was 
accepted, although not to the extent necessary to warrant taking 
the lead in multiplying Canada's commitments to the new Treaty. 
Reid had been able to build a relatively strong case for himself 
by pointing to public attitudes: 
Canadian newspapermen like George Ferguson [editor of 
the Montreal Star] here recently in talking to me, 
urged how essential it is that the document signed at 
the end of the conference on the North Atlantic Treaty 
should make references to , and if possible establish 
immediately, organs similar to those already 
established by the Western union powers. They contest 
that unless this is done, an important section of 
Canadian opinion may feel that the canadian Government 
has failed in what Mr . St . Laurent has called its 
"crusade" [to establish a treaty]''. [27] 
On 1 December 1948 , the Canadian Cabinet approved, with minor 
amendments, a paper intended as the confidential instructions for 
the representative at the Washington discussions - Hume Wrong . 
Reid had failed to gain support for some of his more ambitious 
internationalist aims , but the paper remained a significant 
26. MG26 1 v.224,c25 Nov . 1948 , Heeney t o Reid . 
27. MG31 E46 v.6,20 Nov 1948,Reid to Wrong. 
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victory for him. It referred to building a "closer unity of the 
North Atlantic world", to the establishment of new international 
organs, and to ensuring that the language of the treaty was 
"simple and clear"; most importantly, 
in order to emphasize the positive and moral aspects 
of the Treaty, it should include provision for 
consultation, co-o~eration and common action in the 
economic field.[28j 
Wrong was instructed to abandon his opposition and press for the 
maintenance of the draft Article 2. 
The test of the significance which Canada attached to Article 2 
came at the beginning of February, only a few weeks before the 
end of the negotiations. In mid-January, the Cabinet had been 
told of a proposal put forward by Canada for a simultaneous 
declaration by the parties to the treaty when it was ready to be 
signed: 
The object would be to emphasize that the instrument 
was a "Pact for Peace", not a mere defensive alliance 
and that it had been worked out under the framework of 
the United Nations.[29] 
The Canadian government was not about to accept the elimination 
of Article 2 the most important non-military provisions 
remaining in the draft Treaty. The emergence of the United States 
as strong opponents led to the point in mid-February when Canada 
28. MG32 B5 v.112,memo . to Cabinet 1 Dec . 1948 . 
29 . DEA," prints and rejects", Cabinet conclusion,RC15 . 
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was prepared to threaten withdrawing from the negotiations if 
Article 2 did not remain in a reasonable form . [30] A change in 
attitude by the Americans after Canada had rallied support from 
the European participants , meant that it was not necessary to use 
the threat . The episode does illustrate the importance which 
Canada attached to Article 2 . 
Rather ironically, the Americans found the non- military 
provisions most useful when the Treaty was finally presented to 
the public at the end of March 1949 . Wrong informed Reid that : 
You will I think be interested to 
have yet to see any public statement 
States about the Atlantic Pact from 
omitted a reference t o Article 2. [31] 
know . • • that I 
in the United 
which has been 
Although the Treaty received near unanimous support in the 
House of Commons, it was by no means universally popular . 
French- language newspapers in Montreal and Quebec saw it as 
"appeasement of the imperialists'' . [32] Solon Low, leader of the 
Soc i al Credit party , which drew its support from the prairie 
"bible belt", questioned the motives for so much publicity before 
hand in the press . 
30 . Eayrs , In defence of Canada , 4 , p . 112 . 
31 . MG31 e46 v . 7 , Wrong to Rei d 25 Ma r ch 1949 . 
32. Fraser , The search f or identity , p . 84 . 
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Repetition of this kind of propaganda, he thought, was bound to 
give rise to the suspicion that the government intended to rush 
an agreement through in a wave of public hysteria.[33 ] 
King was most uncomfortable with St Laurent's handling of the 
Treaty. He feared that "the campaign was paralleling that of 
1911" and that "St. Laurent had made so much of the pact that the 
average man in Quebec would get the idea that he would get into 
the European arena at a moments notice. They would be wiser 
to get it over and talk about other things ." [ 34 ] 
During November 1948 , after St Laurent~ became the new Prime 
Minister, Canadian policy towards the North Atlantic Treaty was 
reassessed. Reid's aim of placing Canada in the lead of the 
creation of a treaty reflecting broader internationalist aims was 
opposed by others who were more concerned with securing American 
participation in a military alliance . Canada was not about to 
take the lead in multiplying her own commitments. At the same 
time more than a _mere military alliance was a domestic political 
necessity. In part, this was because of the public expectations 
built up by the speeches of the internationalists who were fond 
33. Harrison, Canada in world affairs,p . 28 . 
34. King diaries,p.23 March 1949 . 
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describing security in terms of the ideals of the United Nations 
and of promoting the connection between defence and economic 
co-operation. In February 1949 Canada was prepared to challenge 
strong American opposition to the Treaty ' s non- military 
provisions . St Laurent was going to be leading the Liberals in a 
general election in less than six months and it was essential 
that the Treaty did not fall short of public expectations . This 
was not the sort of approach that King would have favoured he 
sought wherever possible, to avoid dwelling on potentially 
d ~visive issues . Unlike the men who replaced him , King was not 
motivated by a strong attachment to internationalist ideals . 
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Conclusion 
Mackenzie King's retirement as Prime Minister marked the end of 
an era in Canadian external policy. For most of the years 
between 1921 and 1948, policy was dominated by the belief that 
overseas military commitments were destructive of national unity 
and entailed an unacceptable loss of sovereignty to external 
authority. By the 1940s, however, a younger generation of policy 
makers, motivated by internationalist ideals, controlled the 
civil service and had become an important source of policy 
initiatives. I n matters of both trade and security, they viewed 
the quest for complete national independence as a barrier to 
peaceful state relations. King's last years in office were spent 
resisting the internationalist ambitions of the Department of 
External Affairs and the senior economists in Ottawa. He blocked 
a powerful movement towards free trade, and had he remained in 
office for another year, there is reason to believe that 
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty might also have been 
stopped. Once St Laurent had been chosen as the new leader , King 
was no longer in a position to challenge these internationalist 
policies . Under the new acting Prime Minister , the Canadian 
government became much more firmly devoted t o participation in 
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the North Atlantic Treaty. 
St Laurent was King's personal c·hoice as a successor; he 
considered the Minister of External Affairs to the most able 
candidate for the leadership of the Liberal party. The Prime 
Minister could not easily remain in office to oppose St Laurent 
without forcing the Minister out of cabinet. In March 1948, King 
recorded that "I was even beginning to doubt my own judgement on 
many matters. I found myself much too cautious and conservative 
in international matters to feel my views were shared by some of 
the younger men around me."[1] King was apparently worn out 
after his long years in office and in April he wrote "More and 
more, I feel that I would like to get out of office before any 
new schemes are brought forward which I shall have to endorse or 
oppose." St Laurent and Pearson would have to be left to pursue 
their own policies to the best of their abilities. 
Before he retired, King dealt with pressure from within his own 
government both to conclude a free trade agreement with the 
United States and to enter a more effective collective security 
system, in what for him was typical fashion. The proponents of a 
given policy were given the impression that the Prime Minister 
was favourable to their ideas. No firm position was adopted by 
King, however until the level of political support had been 
assessed : 
1. King diaries , 22 March 1948 . 
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He seemed to be in the centre 
Because we had no centre, 
No vision 
To pierce the smoke-screen of his politics . [2] 
By March 1948, free trade had been judged politically 
unacceptable popular fears about American domination had 
apparently changed very little since 1911 when King himself was 
defeated along with "reciprocity". 
Popular support for the ideal of collective security as 
embodied in the United Nations and the widespread fear of 
Communist expansion in Europe undoubtedly led King to believe 
that the North Atlantic Treaty could be well received within 
Canada. He was, however, most surprised by Cabinet's reaction to 
the Berlin crisis. The old fears about overseas military 
entanglements had not disappeared. If King had remained in 
office, it is not impossible that the Atlantic pact would have 
been abandoned in the same way that free trade was . When the 
decision was made in October to proceed with the development of a 
security pact, ~ing was no longer in control; St Laurent and 
Pearson ensured that internationalist aims took precedence over 
isolationist fears. King's passive approach to finding political 
support had already been replaced by an active campaign to sell 
2. from "W. L. M.K .", F.R. Scott,Selected poems,p.60-61. 
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the North Atlantic Treaty to the Canadian public. Of the old 
Prime Minister, it has been noted that, 
Truly he will be remembered 
Wherever men honour ingenuity, 
Ambiguity, inactivity, and political longevity.[3] 
Gone were the days of "Postpone, postpone, abstain."[4] Canada 
had joined in the mobilisation of Western power against the 
Communist threat. The government had come under the control of 
the men who shaped the course of Canadian external policy for the 
next twenty years. 
In retrospect, the 1940s can be seen as a period when Canada 
was forced to rapidly adjust to the emergence of the United 
States as the dominant world power. Canada was the key to North 
American air defence and it was unreasonable for Canadians to 
think that they could return to the tradition of benign neglect 
in security matters. Unlike the British Empire, the United 
States would not allow Canada to escape her defence obligations. 
In those circumstances, the North Atlantic Treaty was a useful 
means for avoiding a restrictive bilateral arrangement with the 
Americans in favour of a system which included the nations that 
Canada had been allied with in two world wars . 
3 · ibid 
4 · ibid 
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Earlier in the century, Sir Robert Borden sought a more 
prominent position for Canada within the Empire on the basis of a 
contribution the Imperial cause. St Laurent and Pearson also 
sought greater influence in world affairs, first through the 
United Nations and then through the North Atlantic Treaty. This 
influence was founded upon a contribution to the defence against 
expansive Communism in Korea and western Europe . The foundations 
of Canadian nationhood, it has been claimed, were laid by the 
sacrifices of the First Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge. It has also 
been said that Canada's diplomatic influence was greatest in the 
1950s when the Royal Canadian Air Force had an air division of 
twelve squadrons of F-86 Sabres deployed in Europe under NAT0 . [5] 
The longevity of King's policy of "no commitments" and the 
current apathetic attitude towards NATO are probably indications 
that Canadians were only prepared t o make substantial sacrifices 
during periods of perceived danger - the t wo world wars and the 
cold war. 
5 . Stacey,Canada and the Age of Conflic t ,2,p.42~ 
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Appendix 
Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treatj 
The parties ~'lj.J 1 contribute towards the further development of 
peaceful and friendly internationaJ relations by strengthening 
their free ins titut ions, by bringing about a better understanding 
of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and 
by promoting conditions of stabiJ.ity and wel l-being . They wiJ.J. 
seek to eliminate conflict in their economic policies and wilJ. 
encourage economjc collaboration between any or alJ of them. 
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